Immediately, without waiting for official approval by the Revolutionary Military Council (this only happened on February 17, 1927), the documents were transferred to the Baltic Plant for construction. On March 5, 1927, the first three submarines of the 1st series were officially laid down there, subsequently classified as type “D” by the first letter of the name of the lead ship - “Decembrist”.
The first-born of Soviet submarine shipbuilding were created with a double-hull, riveted design. For hull work, high-quality steel was allocated from pre-revolutionary reserves, intended for the construction of Izmail-class battlecruisers and Svetlana-class light cruisers. The robust body (maximum diameter 4.76 m), designed for a maximum diving depth of 90 m, had a complex spindle-shaped shape with smooth transitions from one diameter to another. Therefore, the sheets of its cladding had to be produced by hot hammering according to spatial templates. The spacing was taken to be 500 mm. For the first time in domestic shipbuilding, the hull of a submarine was divided into waterproof compartments. Five spherical and one flat waterproof bulkheads divided the strong hull into seven compartments, the largest of which was the first, which housed most of the torpedo armament and the main living and living quarters of the rank and file. Round holes with a diameter of 800 mm were cut into the bulkheads with doors that were closed using a ratchet device. The strength of the bulkheads on the concavity side was calculated for a pressure of 9 kgf/cm, which corresponded to the maximum immersion depth. The fourth compartment became a refuge - the central post (CP), where the means of controlling the boat and the fight for survivability were concentrated. Here, the main command post (MCP) was also located underwater, and a small cylindrical strong cabin with upper and lower hatches served only to ensure exit from the submarine.
The immersion and ascent system included two end tanks, six pairs of double-sided tanks and a middle main ballast tank (CBT), a durable quick immersion tank, and air lines for high and low pressure systems. The work of the latter was ensured by pipe blowers from the Brown-Boveri company. The ventilation valves of the Central City Hospital were equipped with pneumatic and manual drives, the kingstons of the Central City Hospital were equipped only with manual ones. For ease of navigation, two deck tanks served in a positional position, posts for emergency air purging of the Central City Hospital. high pressure There were, in addition to the CPU, also in compartments I and VII. Also, for the first time, the main ballast tanks were filled with water by gravity, and not using pumps, which made it possible to reduce the emergency submersion time from 3 minutes for Bars-class submarines to 30 seconds. Some ballast tanks could be used as fuel tanks.
The first two ships were equipped with diesel engines from the German company MAN, purportedly purchased for the first Soviet diesel locomotives, as the main engines for surface propulsion. At the same time, the production of such diesel engines was organized at the Kolomna plant named after V.V. Kuibyshev under the brand 42-B-6. The four subsequent boats in the series received them.
The first two boats of the "Decembrist" type were equipped with MAN diesel engines. The separation of diesel engines from the propeller shafts was carried out using friction clutches from the Bamag company. Of the total supply of diesel fuel (128 tons), only 39 tons were placed in tanks inside the pressure hull, and the rest was in on-board ballast tanks (for reloading). Some submariners considered this a drawback of the boats, which, when the light hull was damaged, were unmasked by the appearance of a fuel trace on the surface. However, this was the only way to ensure the achieved high performance in terms of cruising range over water and autonomy.
To achieve the maximum possible underwater range, a two-armature PG-20 electric motor was created - one anchor, rated at 500 hp, provided full speed, the other, rated at 25 hp, was used for economic propulsion. In the submerged position, the double-anchor main propeller electric motors of the type were powered by a battery, four groups of which were located in sealed pits. The battery pits had a battery ventilation system and a hydrogen afterburning furnace, and the placement of the groups ensured easy maintenance of the cells.
At the same time, the high height of the battery pits reduced the volume of office and residential premises. However, the habitability of the boats corresponded to the level of its time: the command personnel were housed in cabins, half of the Red Navy men were in the largest first compartment. The air regeneration system installed on domestic boats for the first time allowed the boats to remain submerged for 72 hours.
The vertical and horizontal rudders received electric and manual control drives. Communication between the compartments was carried out using speaking pipes.
The main armament included 8 torpedo tubes with a reserve of 14 torpedoes of type 53-27 (speed 45 knots with a range of 3.7 km, explosive weight - 265 kg). The submarines were armed with 533-mm torpedo tubes, but the torpedoes themselves did not yet exist at the time they entered service, and the ships used 450-mm torpedoes for combat training, inserting special grids into the torpedo tubes.
A 102-mm B-2 gun (barrel length 45 calibers, elevation angle 60°) and a 37-mm anti-aircraft machine gun were installed in the wheelhouse fence. For the 102 mm gun there were 118 shells, of which 91 were stored in fenders on the bridge. The artillery armament was initially supposed to consist of two 102-mm guns located behind special fairing shields on the upper deck in front of and behind the wheelhouse fence. However, during the discussion of the project, concerns were expressed about a decrease in the combat effectiveness of the submarine due to the flooding of the guns by the wave. After this, they decided to raise the bow gun to the level of the navigation bridge, covering it with a bulwark, and replace the stern gun with a 37-mm anti-aircraft gun, also installing it in the wheelhouse fence. Subsequently, it turned out that this placement of the 102-mm gun was unsuccessful, since it significantly constrained the navigation bridge itself and greatly interfered with the navigation watch, especially during moorings.
Therefore, during a major overhaul with modernization in 1936-1941. the bow gun, having been replaced with a 100-mm B-24 mount (120 rounds), was returned to the upper deck, while the layout and configuration of the navigation bridge was improved. The stern gun was also replaced with a 45 mm 21K mount (500 rounds). All this, along with the convenience of keeping a top watch, improved the stability of the submarine and somewhat reduced the scope of roll. More modern types of radio weapons were installed.
Observation and communication underwater were provided by two periscopes - a commander's and a night anti-aircraft periscope, a noise-direction finder and sound-underwater communication devices. The guaranteed range of the radio station was about 200 miles. The navigation equipment included a Sperry-type gyrocompass and a Forbes log.
The tests of the "Decembrist" were led by the commissioner of the Permanent Commission, Y. K. Zubarev, an experienced commander of the submarine fleet. The lead boat in the surface position reached a maximum speed of 15.3 knots, the dive time was 1.5 minutes (instead of 30 seconds as specified), the initial metacentric height in the surface position was 30 cm, in the submerged position - 15 cm.
These tests, like the tests of the “Revolutionary”, which was somewhat ahead of the lead boat, were complicated not so much by the identified design defects as by the dramatic circumstances of the persecution of the main leaders of the project. Malinin, Kruger and Bazilevsky were arrested by the OGPU on charges of “sabotage.” Therefore, it was necessary to correct the mistakes that are inevitable in any new business with their limited participation.
The most significant disadvantages were the occurrence of a large list during diving and the pressing of the Kingston plate of the fast-diving tank inward by the outboard pressure. The first phenomenon was explained by the overflow of water from side to side in the main ballast tanks on board, which had common ventilation valves. To eliminate this, the tanks were separated on board with the installation of separate side ventilation valves. The Kingston pulp and paper mill was replaced with a plate, which began to be pressed against the saddle by outboard pressure.
The detected overload (about 10 tons) was eliminated by removing the unsuccessful lead underwater anchor and stern capstan, and on Baltic boats it was also compensated by placing seven buoyancy cylinders in the wheelhouse enclosure.
With the elimination of the shortcomings, the boats of the "Decembrist" type turned out to be quite successful and fit their purpose. This is evidenced by the fact that, having formed the basis of the nascent Northern Fleet, they successfully mastered this difficult region.
A total of 6 ships of this project were built. "D-1" was lost in 1940, and the remaining 5 submarines took part in the Great Patriotic War. One, "D-Z", fought in the North, the other, "D-2", - in the Baltic: the rest - in the Black Sea. "D-6" was blown up when leaving Sevastopol, "DZ" and "D-4" were lost, and by the end of the war only two submarines of this project remained in the Navy. Currently, "D-2" is installed as a memorial in St. Petersburg.
| Displacement - surface - 934 tons, underwater - 1361 tons |
| Maximum length - 76.6 m |
| Maximum width - 6.4 m |
| Average draft - 3.8 m |
| Power point - 2 diesel engines with a total power of 2200 hp. and 2 electric motors with a total power of 1050 hp. 2 groups of rechargeable batteries, 60 batteries each, brand "DK", 2 screws. |
| Fuel reserve - normal - 28.5 t, full - 114 |
| Speed - maximum surface - 14.6 knots, underwater 8.5 knots |
| Cruising range - on the surface - 2570 miles at 14.6 knots, - 8950 miles at 9 knots; submerged - 17 at 8.5 knots, - 158 miles at 2.9 knots. |
| Immersion depth - working - 75 meters, maximum - 90 meters |
| Dive time - 90 seconds |
| Armament - 6 533 mm bow torpedo tubes; 2 533 mm aft torpedo tubes; 14 533 mm torpedoes; 1 - 101.6/45 artillery mount "B-2"; 120 - 101.6 mm shots; 1 - 45/46 artillery installation "21-K"; 500 45mm rounds |
| Time spent under water - 72 hours |
| Autonomy - normal - 28 days, maximum - 40 days |
| Buoyancy reserve - 45 % |
| Crew - 10 officers, 10 petty officers, 28 privates |
Laid down on March 5, 1927 in Leningrad at plant No. 189 (Baltic Shipyard). Launched on November 3, 1928, entered service on November 18, 1930. Became part of the Baltic Sea Naval Forces.
In the fall of 1932, it underwent special research tests to accurately identify its tactical and technical elements. From May 18 to August 5, 1933, she moved from Leningrad to Murmansk along the White Sea-Baltic Canal. On August 5, 1933 it became part of the Northern Military Flotilla. On August 21, 1934 it received the letter-numeric designation "D-1". In 1935, in difficult meteorological conditions, she made the transition to Novaya Zemlya (together with “D-2”), and upon returning from the campaign she participated in tactical exercises. August 14 - September 2, 1936 made an Arctic expedition along the route: "Arkhangelsk - Matochkin Shar Ave. - Kara Sea - Russian Harbor - Polyarnoye." 3094 miles covered. From September 23, 1936 to November 8, 1937 - major repairs and modernization. On May 11, 1937 it became part of the Northern Fleet. From September 21 to November 5, 1938, she made a 44-day trek along the route: “Cape Tsyp-Navolok - Vardo Island - Cape North Cape - Bear Island - Nadezhdy Island - Mezhdusharsky Island - Kolguev Island - Cape Kanin Nos - Cape Svyatoy Nos - Kildin Island. Traveled 4841 miles on the surface, 1001 miles underwater. In total, the boat was under water for 11 days. October 31 - 24-hour submerged passage without air regeneration. In 1939-1940 - participation in the Soviet-Finnish war (Soviet-Finnish). Patrolling in the Varanger Fjord area. Made three military campaigns. I didn't achieve any success.
On November 13, 1940, she died under unclear circumstances during a training dive in Motovsky Bay at a depth of 255 meters while practicing combat training tasks. The entire crew (55 people) died.
Commanders: Sekunov B.A. (1930), captain 3rd rank Karpunin V.P. (1936), senior lieutenant Avgustinovich M.P. (1938), Kolyshkin I.A., Eltishchev F.M. (October 29, 1939 - November 13, 1940).
"D-2" ("Narodovolets")
(serial number 178)
Laid down on March 5, 1927 in Leningrad at plant No. 189 (Baltic Shipyard). Launched on May 19, 1929, entered service on October 11, 1931. Became part of the Baltic Sea Naval Forces.
From May 18 to August 5, 1933, she made the transition from Leningrad to Murmansk along the White Sea-Baltic Canal. On August 5, 1933 it became part of the Northern Military Flotilla. On August 21, 1934 it received the letter-numeric designation "D-2". In 1934 she made a trip to Novaya Zemlya. In 1935, in difficult meteorological conditions, she made the transition to Novaya Zemlya (together with “D-1”), and upon returning from the campaign she participated in tactical exercises. In August 1936, paired with "D-1", she visited Novaya Zemlya, and, passing through the Matochkin Shar Strait, entered the Kara Sea. Returning to the Kola Bay, both boats participated in tactical exercises. On May 11, 1937 it became part of the Northern Fleet. In 1937, together with D-3, she made a high-latitude voyage to Bear Island and the Spitsbergen Bank, covering a total of 3,673 miles. From April to May 1939, she provided radio communications to V.K. Kokkinaki’s plane during its non-stop flight to the USA. On September 22-29, 1939 she returned to Leningrad and began repairs and modernization. Became part of the division of boats under construction and overhaul of the Submarine Training Brigade of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet;
On August 17, 1941, upon completion of repairs and modernization, she was again included in the Red Banner Baltic Fleet. At the beginning of September 1941, she left the water area of the plant, after which she was based on the river. Neva. On September 15, 1942, she moved from Leningrad to Kronstadt. September 23 - November 4, 1942 - the first military campaign in the Great Patriotic War.
21 hours 10 minutes September 23 - reached a position in the western area. exits from the Irbensky Strait. and prol. Soelavain (position No. 4; then was supposed to operate at the position of the western island of Bornholm). To the dive point on the East. Gogland reach (arrived at 5 hours 29 minutes on September 24) was moving in support of BTShch-210, -211, -215, -217, -218 and ZSKA. At 16:52 on September 24 in room 45. north-west O. Gogland got caught in an anti-submarine net and hit the ground hard. The vertical rudder failed, and the mine bends of the bow horizontal rudders were torn off. At 21.14 the boat managed to free itself from the net, after which the rudder was examined by 13 divers. The inspection was repeated on the night of September 26, after which the boat's handling improved. At 00.20 on September 29, she completed crossing the Gulf of Finland and at 5 hours 20 minutes on September 29, she arrived in the position area near Cape Ristna. On the morning of September 30, near Irbensky Strait. discovered the enemy's TFR. At 23.03 on September 30, the boat received an order to move to the western position. O. Bornholm (position No. 1). At 09.57 on October 3, she launched a torpedo attack on KON (2 TR, 2 MM) in the area of Hegby Cape (northern tip of Öland Island) (TR 12000 t, attack = sub/vi/2, d = 6 cab., through 1 minute explosion - cut, no data). When launching a repeated attack on the “remaining” TR, the commander considered himself to have been discovered by the MM and abandoned the attack. The submarine was not persecuted. On the morning of October 6, she arrived at the position. At 11.04 on October 7, the OTR launched a torpedo attack to the southwest. Ystad (TR? t, attack = sub/pr/1, d = 7 cab., when fired, surfaced, TR dodged the torpedo - cut, no data). At 22.22 on October 8, the OTR launched a torpedo attack 36 miles north. m-ka Rügenwalde (TR? t, attack = above/pr/1, d = 1.5-2 cable, miss - the Swiss TR "Gunnar" was unsuccessfully attacked). On the afternoon of October 9, she abandoned the OTR attack due to a large CP. At 00.47 on October 11, the OTR launched a torpedo attack 18 miles southeast. m-ka Smyugehuk (TR? t, attack = above/pr/1 d = 3 cable, miss - cut, no data). At 10.39 on October 14, the OTR launched a torpedo attack in the same area (TR? t, attack = sub/pr/1, d = 4 cab., at the moment of the salvo, due to an error by the steering-horizontal operator, the boat went into depth, a miss - a kill, no data). At 16.33 she launched an OTR torpedo attack (TR 8000 t, attack=sub/pr/1, d=4 cables, after 1 minute there was a strong explosion at the point 55°10'N/13°39"E. sunk German TR "Jacobus Fritzen", 4090 brt, cargo of coal, +1, =3). On October 15-18, there was a storm at the position. On the evening of October 16, the Kingston rod of the fast submersion tank broke - the artillery magazine was flooded, the tank was out of order. On October 18, she got caught in a fishing net. At 17.55 on October 19, KON launched a torpedo attack (2 PRZD, 1 VSKR, 5 SKR) at point 55°11"9 N/19°15"1 E. (PRZD, attack = sub/vi/2, d = 6 cab., after 1 min 2 explosions were heard - the German PRZD “Deutschland” was damaged, 2972 brt, transporting vacationers of the Norwegian Legion, +24, = 29, PRZD repaired by February 1943). The core was counterattacked to no avail. PLOs that dropped 16 gigabytes. On October 22, she moved to the bay area. Hana. On the afternoon of October 23, she was unable to attack the OTR due to an unfavorable command posture. On October 25 she transferred to Karlskrona. On the night of October 26, she discovered a submarine, which she evaded by turning. In the morning, by order of the command, I began returning to base. On the evening of October 29, 10 miles east. O. Bogshere was discovered and unsuccessfully attacked by the enemy TFR, which dropped 48 GB. At 21.36 on October 30, she began crossing the Gulf of Finland. At 20.57 on November 3, while crossing the barrier, the Seeigel touched the mine defender's mine. At 11.18 on November 4, the submarine was met by our SKA and arrived in the bay during the day. Norre-Kappellaht (Lavensari Island). At 17.00 on November 6 - 00.55 on November 7, in support of BTShch-207, -210, -211, -217, -218 and 2 SKA moved to Kronstadt.
On the evening of November 10, 1942 she moved to Leningrad for repairs and winter parking. At the crossing, she was fired upon by enemy artillery to no avail. On May 10, 1943, she was prepared for a combat campaign. On August 12, 1943, she moved from Leningrad to Kronstadt. While crossing, she was subjected to enemy artillery fire without result. In the summer of 1944, it received the English sonar station “ASDIC-129” (“Dragon”) and a bubble-free torpedo firing system (BTS). Until October 1944 she carried out combat training in Kronstadt. October 01-30, 1944 - second military campaign in the Second World War. On October 1-5, the Finnish skerry fairway entered the Baltic Sea for operations in the eastern region. coast of the island Öland - south. entrance to the strait Kalmarsund (position No. 9). Immediately after the release, equipment breakdowns began. On October 6, the vertical rudder temporarily failed. At 10.00 on October 8, the OTR launched a torpedo attack 33 miles south. m. Khoborg (TR 1000 t, attack = sub/vi/2, d = 5 cab., TR evaded torpedoes - cut, no data, apparently a Swiss fishing vessel was attacked). On the evening of October 9, the UAV commander ordered the boat to occupy a sector limited by bearings 245-220° southwest of Libau (sector No. 2). On the evening of October 10, she arrived at a new position. On October 11, the vertical rudder limiter on the submarine failed. On October 16, she was unable to attack OTR due to an unfavorable command position. On October 19, the periscope shaft was flooded with water. On October 20, the Fedoritsky coupling failed. On October 22, Gall's circuit failed. On the morning of October 24, in the area of the Pappensee Cape, she was unable to attack the KON due to an error by the horizontal helmsman. On the morning of October 26, by order of the commander, the BPL took up a position at Mt. Pappensee. At 12.54 on October 26, she launched a torpedo attack by KON (1 TR, 1 MM, 1 SKR) 8 miles west. m-pappensee (TR 5000 t (according to other sources transport “Nina” (“Nina”, 1371 brt)), attack = sub/vi/2, d = 8 cab., the commander observed the death of the TR through the periscope - cut, data No). After the attack, the submarine counterattacked the cor. PLO, which dropped 5 GB on the boat. Due to the forces of explosions, the submarine hit the ground twice, after which the vertical rudder began to shift only 4°, and then stopped working altogether. At 02.20 on October 27, she began returning to base, controlled by propellers. On the afternoon of October 29, she anchored off the island. Utö, arrived in Turku on October 30.
December 12, 1944 - January 20, 1945 - third military campaign in the Second World War. At 08.48 on December 12, it left Helsinki to a position limited by bearings 250-270° west. Vindavas (sector No. 1). On December 13, the pump shock absorber burst. At 17.30 on December 14, she arrived at the position. The actions of the submarines were greatly hampered by the sparking of diesel engines and the large formation of steam when the diesel engines were exhausted into the water. Throughout the campaign she had numerous contacts with PLO forces. On the evening of December 16, while trying to attack KON, it was discovered and attacked by the TFR, which dropped several. glb. At 04.52 on December 23, she launched a torpedo attack by KON (1 TR, 1 SKR) at point 57°21"8 N/21°05"5 E. (TR? t, attack = above/vi/2, d = 5 cable, miss - cut, no data). On the afternoon of December 25, she discovered 4 DB B, but did not launch an attack. On the night of December 26, it was unable to attack the KON due to opposition from the TFR. At 20.10 on December 29, she launched a torpedo attack by KON (2 TR, 3 SKR) at point 57°17"8 N/21°07"2 E. (TR 9-10000 t, attack = above/vi/2, d = 3.5-4 cable, after 50 seconds 1 torpedo was observed to hit the TR - cut, no data). The submarine was not persecuted. On the morning of January 1, 1945, the cort was discovered and fired upon to no avail. PLO. At 06.19 on January 3, she launched a torpedo attack by KON (1 TR, 1 SKR) (TR? t, attack = above/vi/2, d = 6 cable, miss - cut, no data). In the following days I had contact exclusively with the correspondent. PLO. On January 10, I received orders to operate in the southern sectors. and southwest Vindavas (position No. 5-new). On January 16, during a storm, the horizontal rudders were damaged. On the morning of January 18, when laying on the ground at a depth of 62 m during a storm, it hit the rocks hard - the kingstones of the ballast tanks and the vertical rudder were damaged. At 20.13 began returning to base. At 14.00 on January 20, BTShch-217 was met and at 21.55 it arrived at Hanko.
April 20 - May 18, 1945 - fourth military campaign in the Second World War. At 13.58 on April 20, she reached a position 60 miles south. m-ka Faludden (occupied part of position No. 8). On the afternoon of April 22, near the north-east. coast of the island Gotland discovered by SW. cor. PLO, which within 4 hours unsuccessfully dropped 68 GB on the submarine. At 21.20 on April 23, she arrived at the position. On April 27, by order of the commander, the BPL moved to Libau (position No. 1). On the night of April 28, it was discovered and attacked by the TFR, which dropped 7 Gb within 1 hour. A leak developed at the junction of the pressure hull sheets in compartment VI, and the rapid immersion tanks were damaged. On the night of May 7, the boat received an order to take a position on the approaches to Libau at 56°18"N/19°30"E. (busy by 10.00). On the night of May 9, she discovered the TFR, but did not launch an attack due to an unfavorable command posture. On May 11, she received an order to take a position between the meridian of Hoborg Monastery and Fr. Utklippan and parallels 55°45" and 57°00" N. Due to the end of hostilities, she arrived in Turku on May 18.
February 15, 1946 - December 24, 1955 was part of the 4th Navy, carrying out combat training missions. On January 12, 1949, she was classified as a large submarine. On June 9, 1949, renamed “B-2.” On June 20, 1956, it was withdrawn from combat service, disarmed and reorganized into a survivability training station. On August 17, 1956, it was renamed UTS-6. In 1969, a memorial plaque was installed on the boat. On March 5, 1987, it was excluded from the lists of Navy vessels. On July 8, 1989, after restoration, it was installed in Leningrad (near the Shkipersky channel near the Marine Station) as a monument to the Russian fleet and shipbuilding. The submarine's compartments have been recreated as they were during the war. On September 2, 1994, it was opened for inspection as a branch of the Central Naval Museum.
Duration of combat service - 46.3 months (July 1, 1941 - May 9, 1945). 4 military campaigns (69 days). 12 torpedo attacks, as a result of which 2 ships (5461 GRT) were sunk and 1 ship was damaged, possibly 1 more ship was sunk.
The commanders were: Nazarov M.K. (1931), volume 2 r. Reisner L.M. (1936), art. l. Zhukov A.A. (1939), k. lit., k. 3 r., k. 2 r. Lindenberg R.V. (1941-1945)
“D-3”
(serial number 179)
Laid down on March 5 in Leningrad at plant No. 189 (Baltic Shipyard). Launched on July 12, 1929, entered service on November 14, 1931. Became part of the Baltic Sea Naval Forces.
From July 26 - September 21, 1933 - passage from Leningrad to Murmansk along the White Sea-Baltic Canal. On September 21, 1933 it became part of the Northern Military Flotilla. On August 21, 1934 it received the letter-numeric designation "D-3". On May 11, 1937 it became part of the Northern Fleet. In 1937, together with D-2, she made a high-latitude voyage to Bear Island and the Spitsbergen Bank, covering a total of 3,673 miles.
On February 5, 1938, she headed to the Kola Bay to determine magnetic deviation, and in the morning of the next day she set out on a course to exit the bay into the Barents Sea. On board the boat was a group of the best radio operators in the fleet. They were supposed to support the radio bridge: station "SP-1" - Moscow. In February 1938, she participated in the removal of the polar station "SP-1" from the ice floe, led by D.I. Papanin. On February 13, 1938, for the first time in history, she passed under Arctic ice, crossing a 5-cable ice bridge that separated her from clean water (30-minute dive). From October 1938 to April 1940, major repairs and modernization took place in Leningrad.
June 22 - July 4, 1941 the first military campaign in the Great Patriotic War. The beginning of the war was met in Motka Bay according to the combat training plan. At 19.43 on June 22, 1941, she reached a position in the area of Cape Nordkin. On June 25, she discovered the periscope of an enemy submarine, but was unable to attack it, and evaded it by urgent diving and maneuvering. There were no more meetings with the enemy. The boat returned safely to base.
August 16 - September 7, 1941 third military campaign in the Second World War. On August 19, she launched an attack on a transport traveling as part of a convoy, but the torpedo missed because she had to fire blindly due to the submersion of the periscope. On August 25, she again discovered enemy transport, but was unable to launch an attack. The boat returned safely to base.
September 22 - October 17, 1941 fourth military campaign in the Second World War. She practiced a new method of torpedo firing, when not one, but two or three torpedoes were fired at a target, which gave the greatest possibility of hitting the enemy. Returning from the campaign, the boat commander announced four attacks (September 26, 27, 30 and October 11), during which 1 tanker and 3 enemy transports were sunk (on September 26, a 2,000 GRT transport was sunk, and on September 27, a 1,500 GRT tanker was sunk , on September 30, when launching an attack, the boat ran aground, from which it was removed an hour later, and on October 11, the commander did not see the result of the attack, since after the release of torpedoes the target was hidden by a snow charge).
November 22 - December 15, 1941 fifth military campaign in the Second World War. On November 28, at Cape Sverholt-Klubben in Porsangerfjord, a transport with a displacement of 6,000 gross tons is attacked. Although upon the return of the boat to the base, its commander was credited with its destruction, but according to post-war data, the enemy did not lose any transports at that time and in that place.
On December 5, in the area of the North Cape - Porsanger Fjord, the boat discovered two enemy transports under the escort of a destroyer. After 50 minutes, "D-3" fired four torpedoes at the terminal transport with a displacement of 10,000 gross tons. Hearing the explosions, the boat believed that the transport had been sunk, but according to enemy data, the Leina transport with a displacement of 6,856 GRT, which was escorted by a minesweeper, was attacked to no avail. On December 6, 1941, the boat goes on the attack again. At 13.57 a convoy was discovered consisting of a three-masted transport escorted by a minesweeper. The boat attacked the transport with three torpedoes, and at 14.18, having surfaced under the periscope, the commander saw that the ship was plunging its nose into the water, and the minesweeper was removing people from it. As a result of this attack, the boat was credited with sinking the Abraham Lincoln transport with a displacement of 9,570 GRT. According to other sources, the target of the attack was the 2,959 GRT Moshill and 5,013 GRT Ringar transports, which were escorting the destroyer. This convoy did not suffer any losses and arrived safely at its destination. As a result of the last campaign, she was credited with the destruction of three enemy transports with a total displacement of 25,000 GRT. (based on the results of 1941 - 7 transports of 36,000 GRT).
On January 17, 1942, by decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, “for the exemplary performance of combat missions of the command on the front of the fight against the German invaders and the valor and courage displayed,” the submarine “D-3” was awarded the Order of the Red Banner.
February 22 - March 16, 1942 sixth military campaign in the Second World War. Reaching a position in the Tana fjord area. On February 27, the boat discovered an enemy convoy, but the attack failed due to a mistake by the commander. It was not possible to launch an attack on enemy minesweepers on March 3 either. On March 8, 1942, the D-3 was recalled from its position to cover the allied convoy PQ-12, and on March 11, the Krasnogvardeets went to the rescue of the Shch-402, which was left without fuel off the enemy coast. The fastest to come to the aid of "Shch-402" was "K-21", and "D-3" on March 13 received an order to follow to its previous position. The next day, the boat attacks a formation of German ships consisting of the Brummer and Cobra minelayers, guarded by four minesweepers. The commander of the boat announced the destruction of the enemy patrol ship, but the torpedo passed a few meters from the minesweeper "M-1504". The enemy dropped 36 depth charges on the boat, from the explosions of which the sea level tank began to leak and water began to flow into the compartment through the water gauge glass. On the evening of March 14, 1942, the boat commander received the go-ahead to return to base.
May 2-18, 1942 Seventh military campaign in the Second World War. Already on May 2, the boat attacked the convoy. Explosions were heard on the boat and the 6,000 GRT transport was considered sunk. In fact, the transports “Algol” (976 brt) and “Yuris” (3.232 brt), which were escorting three ships, were attacked. Passing torpedoes saw the escort ships, and the convoy arrived at its destination without losses. On May 16, the boat goes on the attack again. Despite the fact that its commander, according to him, saw 5 escort ships removing people from the dying transport, the success of this attack is also not confirmed by the enemy. The next day, the Hallingdal transport, escorted by 5 ships, was attacked. The commander of the boat announced the sinking of a transport with a displacement of 12,000 GRT, but the enemy did not lose any ships at this time and in this place. Upon returning from the campaign, the boat commander reported the sinking of three enemy transports with a total displacement of 26,000 gross tons. Based on the results of seven cruises, the boat sank 8 enemy transports with a total displacement of 28,140 GRT and damaged 1 transport with a total displacement of 3,200 GRT. There is no confirmation yet that the attacks were successful.
June 10, 1942 went out on the last eighth combat campaign in the Second World War. The boat never made contact again and never returned to base. Along with the boat, 53 members of its crew also died. The boat was probably killed by a mine in the area of Cape Helnes, although it is possible that it was blown up by the Bantos A barrier at the entrance to the Kola Bay, which was placed on March 20, 1942 by the Brummer and Cobra minelayers, which so safely avoided torpedoes from "D-3" a week before the mine laying.
Duration of combat service - 12.3 months (June 22, 1941 - June 30, 1942). 8 military campaigns (138 days). 11 torpedo attacks, which may have sunk 4 ships and damaged 1.
The commanders were: Griboyedov K.N. (1931), art. Lt Kotelnikov D.I. (1938), Ph.D. Konstantinov F.V. (1941), k. lit., k. 3 r. Bibiev M.A. (1941-1942).
"D-4"
(serial number 27)
Laid down on March 25, 1927 in Nikolaev at plant No. 198. Launched on April 6, 1929, entered service on January 5, 1931. Became part of the Black Sea Naval Forces.
On October 18-21, 1933, she paid a visit to Istanbul. On September 15, 1934 it received the letter-numeric designation "D-4". On January 11, 1935 it became part of the Black Sea Fleet. From December 1938 to September 27, 1941, she was stationed at Sevmorzavod in Sevastopol for major repairs and modernization. September 27, 1941 relocation to Poti.
September 29 - October 10, 1941 the first military campaign in the Great Patriotic War. Inconclusive.
November 29 - December 29, 1941 fourth military campaign in the Second World War. On December 1, 1941, east of Cape Kaliakra, the boat attacked a convoy of two transports escorted by destroyers with three torpedoes, but the torpedoes missed.
May - May 9, 1942 seventh military campaign in the Second World War. Transport tasks to support Sevastopol.
May 15 - May 21, 1942 eighth military campaign in the Second World War. Transport tasks to support Sevastopol.
May 23 - May 28, 1942 ninth military campaign in the Second World War. Transport tasks to support Sevastopol. On May 27, 1942, in the area of Cape Ai-Todor, the boat was attacked by enemy boats, and in the area of Cape Utrish near Novorossiysk - by a torpedo bomber. She successfully avoided damage and returned safely to base.
May 29 - June 4, 1942 tenth military campaign in the Second World War. Transport tasks to support Sevastopol.
June 5 - June 12, 1942 eleventh military campaign in the Second World War. Transport tasks to support Sevastopol. Over five supply trips to Sevastopol, it delivered 318.6 tons of cargo to the city, of which 123 tons of ammunition, 38 tons of gasoline, 157.6 tons of food, and evacuated 78 people to the Caucasus.
June - July 2, 1942 unsuccessful exit. Strong enemy anti-aircraft defense did not allow the boat to deliver cargo (44 tons of ammunition and 6.2 tons of food).
March 23 - April 12, 1943 fourteenth military campaign in the Second World War. To no avail. According to some reports, the Bulgarian steamship "Rodina" of 4.158 GRT became a victim of the boat's torpedoes.
May 22 - June 11, 1943 fifteenth military campaign in the Second World War. On June 1, 1943, in the area of Cape Tarkhankut, he attacked an enemy convoy twice. Torpedoes pass without hitting their targets.
August 3 - August 28, 1943 sixteenth military campaign in the Second World War. Destruction of two transports at Cape Tarkhankut. On August 10, the steamer "Boy Feddersen" with 6,689 grt (former Soviet "Kharkov") was sunk, and on August 20, the Bulgarian steamer "Varna" with 2,141 grt.
November 11, 1943 went out on the last seventeenth military campaign in the Second World War. On November 23, in the area of Yevpatoria, the boat sent the Santa Fe transport of 4.627 GRT to the bottom.
On December 4, 1943, it was presumably sunk in the Kalimitsky Gulf southwest of Cape Uret by the anti-submarine ships "Uj - 103" and "Uj - 102" after an unsuccessful attack by landing barge No. 566. The entire crew was killed (presumably 53 people).
Duration of combat service - 26.1 months (October 1, 1941 - December 4, 1943), 16 combat campaigns (212 days). 6 torpedo attacks, as a result of which 3 transports (13,757 GRT) were sunk.
The commanders were: Surin V.S. (1931), k. l-t, k. 3 r. Izrailevich I.S. (1941), Ph.D. Trofimov I.Ya. (1943).
"D-5" ("Spartak")
(serial number 28)
Laid down on March 25, 1927 in Nikolaev at plant No. 198 (Nikolaev State Plant). Launched on April 16, 1929, entered service on May 17, 1931. Became part of the Black Sea Naval Forces.
On October 18-21, 1933, she paid a visit to Istanbul. On September 15, 1934 it received the letter-numeric designation "D-5". On January 11, 1935 it became part of the Black Sea Fleet.
November 18 - November 21, 1941 fifth military campaign in the Second World War. On November 19, 1941, she fired at enemy positions in the Alushta area.
December 28, 1941 - January 2, 1942 sixth military campaign in the Second World War. On December 30, 1941, as part of the Kerch-Feodosia landing operation, she landed a sabotage group in Koktebel Bay. Of the 31 people, only 21 were able to land, and two of them died during the landing, capsizing in the boat. The remaining ten people were taken back to Novorossiysk. Until January 2, 1942, navigation support for the Kerch-Feodosia landing operation.
On March 23, 1942, while parked in Tuapse, the boat received heavy damage to the hull and mechanisms from close explosions of aerial bombs, but remained afloat and was put in for repairs.
June 26 - July 1, 1942 ninth military campaign in the Second World War. Transport provision of Sevastopol. Over three flights, it delivered 120.2 tons of ammunition, 71 tons of gasoline, and evacuated 177 people to the Caucasus.
December 4 - December 18, 1942 fourteenth military campaign in the Second World War. On December 8, 1942, a boat with artillery fire sends the Turkish motor-sailing schooner "Kociboglu" ("Kociboglu" - 100 tons) to the bottom.
Spring 1943 - put into repair. She no longer took part in hostilities.
Since October 15, 1946, it has been at the disposal of the Navy Mine and Torpedo Research Institute. On October 2, 1948, the boat was converted into an experimental submarine. On January 12, 1949, she was classified as a large submarine. June 16, 1949 renamed "B-32". On December 29, 1955, she was disarmed and expelled from the Navy in connection with delivery to the OFI for dismantling and sale. On January 18, 1956, it was disbanded and subsequently cut into metal at the Glavvtorchermet base in Sevastopol.
Duration of combat service - 20.3 months (June 22, 1941 - March 1, 1943), 16 combat campaigns (145 days). 1 torpedo attack. 1 ship (100 tons) was sunk by artillery fire.
The commanders were: k. 3 r. Savitsky S.T. (1941), art. l-t., k. l-t. Strshelnitsky Yu.A. (1941), art. l-t., k. l-t. Timofeev I.Ya. (1942), Ph.D. Sukhodolsky N.V. (1944), volume 3 Panov N.A. (1944).
"D-6" ("Jacobin")
(serial number 29)
Laid down on March 25, 1927 in Nikolaev at plant No. 198 (Nikolaev State Plant). Launched on November 15, 1930, entered service on June 12, 1931. Became part of the Black Sea Naval Forces.
On October 18-21, 1933, she paid a visit to Istanbul. On September 15, 1934 it received the letter-numeric designation "D-6". On January 11, 1935 it became part of the Black Sea Fleet. In 1935 (?) she arrived at Sevmorzavod in Sevastopol for major repairs and modernization. On August 18, 1941, she went to sea, but 60 miles west of Sevastopol she was attacked by enemy aircraft, was damaged and was forced to return and stand again for repairs. On November 12, 1941, during the bombing of the Marine Plant in Sevastopol, it was damaged for the second time. On June 26, 1942, due to the impossibility of evacuation with the disassembled hull and mechanisms, by order of the command it was blown up and destroyed by the crew on the eve of the abandonment of the city by Soviet troops. On July 11, 1942, she was expelled from the Navy. In the spring of 1945, it was raised by the Black Sea Fleet emergency rescue service. On June 7, 1945, due to the impracticality of restoration, she was excluded from the Black Sea Fleet for the second time in connection with her delivery to the OFI for dismantling and cutting into metal.
On November 1, 1926, a special technical bureau No. 4 (Technical Bureau) was created at the Baltic plant to prepare working drawings of the lead submarine. It was headed by engineer B.M. Malinin.
After graduating from the shipbuilding department of the St. Petersburg Polytechnic Institute in 1914, B.M. Malinin worked in the underwater navigation department of the Baltic Shipyard, where he supervised the repair of small-displacement submarines ("Som" and "Pike"), completing construction according to the drawings of I.G. Bubnov Submarines of the "Bars" and "Kasatka" type, and in the 20s he headed this department.
In terms of depth of knowledge of the design and construction technology of pre-revolutionary submarines, engineer B.M. Malinin had no equal in the country.
In 1924, he developed a preliminary design for a double-hull, seven-compartment torpedo submarine with a displacement of 755 tons. Its armament consisted of three bow and six traverse torpedo tubes, a full ammunition load of 18 torpedoes, two anti-aircraft guns of 100 mm and 76 mm caliber.
Although the project suffered from many serious shortcomings, it at the same time testified to the maturity of the design thought of its author.
In addition to B.M. Malinin, the Technical Bureau included E.E. Kruger (graduated from the Polytechnic Institute, participated in the First World War, and since 1921 headed the submarine repair shop at the Baltic Shipyard) and A.N. Shcheglov (graduated Marine Engineering School, after special training at the UOPP in Libau, he served before the war as a mechanical engineer on the submarines of the Baltic Fleet and the Black Sea Fleet, was appointed to the underwater navigation department of the Baltic Shipyard, and in 1924 he began at NTKM to develop a preliminary design for an underwater minelayer.
Along with the engineers of the Technical Bureau, designers and draftsmen A.I. Korovitsyn, A.S. Troshenkov, F.Z. Fedorov and A.K. Shlyupkin worked.
B.M. Malinin wrote that a small team of the Technical Bureau (of 7 people) had to simultaneously solve three problems that were closely related to each other:
- conduct the development and construction of submarines, the type of which was unknown to us until that time;
- Create and immediately practically use the theory of submarines, which did not exist in the USSR;
- To train a cadre of submarine designers during the design process.
A week before the laying of the first Soviet submarines, engineer S.A. Bazilevsky was accepted into the Technical Bureau on the recommendation of Professor P.F. Papkovich. He had just graduated from the shipbuilding department of the Polytechnic Institute in 1925 and worked as a senior engineer at the USSR Maritime Register to draw up rules for the construction of ships.
The workers of the Technical Bureau were given one seemingly modest task - to create a ship no less combat-ready than modern submarines of the largest capitalist states.
The USSR Navy Directorate created a special commission to monitor the development of design and technical documentation and the construction of the submarine (Kompad Mortekhupr).
A.P. Shershov, a prominent specialist in military shipbuilding, was appointed its chairman. The work of the commission was attended by the head of the underwater diving department of the Mortekhupra L.A. Beletsky, specialist sailors A.M. Krasnitsky, P.I. Serdyuk, G.M. Simanovich, later - N.V. Alekseev, A.A. Antinin, G.F.Bolotov, K.L.Grigaitis, T.I.Gushlevsky, K.F.Ignatiev, V.F.Kritsky, Ya.Ya.Peterson.
K.F. Terletsky, a former submarine officer of the Baltic Fleet, a very energetic and active organizer, was appointed the main builder and responsible deliverer of the submarine.
The commissioning mechanic was G.M. Trusov, who participated in the First World War on the submarines "Lamprey", "Vepr", "Tur" and was promoted from engine non-commissioned officers to second lieutenant in the Admiralty. During the Ice Passage, he was elected chairman of the ship committee of the submarine "Tur", then served as a senior mechanical engineer of the underwater minelayer "Rabochiy" (formerly "Ruff"). He was awarded the title of Hero of Labor of the KBF.
The duties of the commissioning captain were assigned to A.G. Shishkin, the former assistant commander of the Panther submarine.
In choosing the optimal solutions regarding the overall layout and equipment of the project with weapons, mechanisms and equipment, the technical bureau employees were provided with significant assistance by the operational and technical commission of the fleet. It was headed by A.N. Garsoev and A.N. Zarubin. The commission included A.N. Bakhtin, A.Z. Kaplanovsky, N.A. Petrov, M.A. Rudnitsky, Ya.S. Soldatov.
By February 1927, it was possible to prepare a set of “backfill” drawings: a sketch of the general arrangement, a theoretical drawing and drawings of the middle part of the submarine hull without bulkheads, tanks, superstructures and ends.
The official laying of the first-born Soviet submarine shipbuilding took place at the Baltic Shipyard on March 5, 1927.
On the tanks of the rapid submersion of the submarines "Decembrist", "Narodovolets" and "Krasnogvardeets" "mortgage" boards (silver plates with the text of B.M. Malinin and the silhouette of the submarine) were laid.
40 days later, on April 14, 1927, 3 submarines were laid down in Nikolaev for the Black Sea Fleet. They were given the names "Revolutionary", "Spartacist" and "Jacobin".
Their construction was supervised by the head of the Submarine Bureau of the Nikolaev plant G.M. Sinitsyn; B.M. Voroshilin, the former commander of the submarine "Tiger" (BF), "Political Worker" ("AG-26", Black Sea Fleet), and then the commander of a separate division of the submarine Black Sea Fleet, was appointed commissioning captain.
The construction was monitored by representatives of the Navy (Nikolaevsk Committee) A.A. Esin, V.I. Korenchenko, I.K. Parsadanov, V.I. Pershin, A.M. Redkin, V.V. Filippov, A.G. Khmelnitsky and others.
Submarines of the "Decembrist" type had a double hull of riveted construction. In addition to the strong hull, capable of withstanding outboard water pressure when diving at the maximum diving depth, they had a second, so-called light hull, completely enclosing the pressure hull.
The durable, hermetically sealed body consisted of a casing and a frame. The casing was the shell of the hull and was made of steel sheets. For the Decembrist class submarine, high-quality steel was allocated, which was used before the revolution for the construction of Izmail-class battlecruisers and Svetlana-class light cruisers.
All sheets of thick lining of the durable hull were made by hot hammering according to spatial templates. A set of durable hulls consisted of frames and served to ensure the stability of the skin and give the entire structure sufficient rigidity. The ends of the durable hull shell were end bulkheads, and transverse bulkheads divided its internal volume into compartments.
The robust hull was divided into 7 compartments by six steel spherical bulkheads. For communication between the compartments, the bulkheads had round openings with a diameter of 800 mm with doors that could be quickly closed using a ratchet wedge device.
The lightweight hull with smooth streamlined contours also had a skin with reinforcing ribs: transverse frames and longitudinal stringers, which are the roofs of ballast tanks. Its bow and stern permeable ends were given a pointed shape to reduce wave drag.
The space between the strong and light hulls (double space) was divided by transverse bulkheads into 6 pairs of main ballast tanks.
In a submerged position, they were filled with water and communicated with the outboard environment through kingstons (valves of a special design). Kingstons (one for each tank) were located in the lower part of the light hull along the center plane of the submarine. They ensured the simultaneous filling of tanks on both sides. During immersion, water entered the tanks through ventilation valves installed on the longitudinal stringers of the light hull above the waterline.
When the submarine was floating in a submerged position, the seams of all main ballast tanks were open and the ventilation valves were closed. To ascend from underwater to surface, water ballast was removed (blown) from the tanks with compressed air. The strength of the light hull was supposed to ensure the navigation of the Decembrist-class submarine in severe storm conditions and even in ice conditions.
B.M. Malinin himself dealt with issues of speed, maneuverability and strength. Calculations of the strength of the light hull, internal tanks and baffles, as well as buoyancy and stability in the surface and submerged position were entrusted to A.N. Shcheglov, the design of the propeller shaft, steering, capstan and periscope devices - to E.E. Kruger, immersion and ascent systems, pipelines of general ship systems, as well as calculations of unsinkability and strength of spherical bulkheads - to S.A. Bazilevsky.
The development of electrical equipment was undertaken by the electrical engineering bureau of the Baltic Plant, headed by A.Ya. Barsukov.
In May 1927, engineer P.Z. Golosovsky, who graduated from the Moscow Higher Technical School, was accepted into the Technical Bureau. Bauman in aircraft engineering. Young employees, also not previously associated with underwater shipbuilding, got involved in the work - A.V. Zaichenko, V.A. Mikhayolov, I.M. Fedorov.
Soon, Technical Bureau No. 4 was divided into 4 sectors, led by A.N. Shcheglov (hull), E.E. Kruger (mechanical), S.A. Bazilevsky (systems sector) and P.P. Bolshedvorsky (electrical).
Almost all calculations for the Decembrist-class submarine were of a dual nature: on the one hand, they used precise methods of the structural mechanics of a surface ship, on the other hand, approximate refinements to these methods, trying to take into account the peculiarities of the submarine.
Among the structures specific to submarines and absent on surface ships, first of all, one should include the spherical bulkheads of the pressure hull. It was possible to calculate the main panel of the bulkhead for strength under a load from the concavity side of 9 atm and for shape stability from the convex side. The calculated pressure on the bulkhead from the convex side was taken to be no more than 50% of the same pressure from the concave side.
The methodology for most calculations of buoyancy and stability had to be created anew. The buoyancy reserve of the Dekabrist class submarine was 45.5%. The reserve of buoyancy is equal to the waterproof volume of the ship located above the design waterline. The submarine's buoyancy reserve corresponds to the amount of water that must be taken into the tanks for the submarine to submerge. In the submerged position, the submarine's buoyancy reserve is zero, in the surface position it is the difference between the submerged and surface displacement. For a submarine on the surface, the buoyancy reserve is usually in the range of 15 - 45%.
The following circumstances were taken as the basis for choosing the location of the transverse bulkheads on the Decembrist type submarine.
The submarine had two compartments: bow and diesel, the length of which was determined by the equipment located in them.
The bow compartment housed the breech parts of the aircraft, their maintenance devices and spare torpedoes. In diesel - diesel engines, friction clutches on the propeller shaft line and control stations.
All other compartments allowed a reduction in length within a fairly wide range. Therefore, it was these two compartments that should have limited the required buoyancy reserve. It was adopted, by analogy with strength calculations, equal to twice the volume of the largest compartment (i.e., without taking into account the volume of equipment and machinery located in the compartment).
Consequently, the remaining compartments could be smaller.
At the same time, it was necessary to keep the number of bulkheads within reasonable limits, because The displacement of the submarine depended on their total mass. The main requirements were imposed on the shelter compartment (survivability compartment).
It had to have the necessary devices to control the ship’s general diving and ascent systems, drainage systems, as well as for personnel to reach the surface. With spherical bulkheads, the strength of which is not the same on different sides, a shelter can only be that compartment that is separated from both adjacent compartments by bulkheads convex in its direction.
On the Decembrist-class submarine, the central post (CP) was chosen as a shelter compartment, in which the main and reserve command posts (GKP and ZKP) were located. The legality of this decision was explained by the fact that, firstly, the largest number of means of combating survivability was concentrated in the CP (blowing water ballast, drainage, controlling the progress of submarines, locking, etc.), secondly, it was one of the shortest and therefore the least vulnerable, since the probability of flooding of any compartment is approximately proportional to its length, thirdly, it concentrated the command staff best prepared to fight to save the damaged submarine of its crew. Therefore, both strong bulkheads of the CPU were convexly turned into it. However, spare posts for blowing the main ballast with high-pressure air were also provided in the end compartments.
Of all the difficulties that the designers encountered, the greatest was the problem of immersion and ascent. On the Bars-class submarine, water ballast was taken in during submersion using electric pumps for at least 3 minutes, which after the First World War was already considered an unacceptably long time. Therefore, the method for calculating the filling of main ballast tanks by gravity for the Dekabrist type submarine was created anew. The constructive implementation of the immersion system was guided only by the laws of hydraulics.
The double-breasted tanks were divided along the center plane by a continuous vertical keel without lightening cutouts. But at the same time, to simplify the system, each pair of on-board tanks was equipped with one common kingston, embedded in the vertical keel and not ensuring the density of their separation either in the open or closed state. The ventilation pipes of each pair of such tanks were also connected to each other in the superstructure and were equipped with one common valve.
For the ventilation valves, pneumatic drives were used as the most simple and reliable, and the kingstons were controlled by roller drives, brought to the level of the living deck in those compartments where the kingston itself was installed. The position of all kingston plates and ventilation valves was monitored by the CPU using electrical sensors and lamp indicators. To further increase the reliability of diving systems, all ventilation valves were equipped with redundant manual drives.
The instructions for diving and ascent were based on a firm principle: the main ballast should be received only simultaneously into all tanks. In this case, the center of gravity of the received ballast water remains at all times in the lowest possible position. And this ensures the greatest stability of weight, which was the only thing to be taken into account at this time.
For diving, the main ballast was taken into two end ballasts. 6 pairs of double-breasted tanks and one middle one (a total of 15 tanks. The latter was also located in the double-breasted space, but in its lower part, near the midsection, and was distinguished by a smaller volume and increased strength. This was supposed to ensure the possibility of more quickly blowing it with high pressure air in the event accident. The idea of this device was borrowed from the Bars-class submarine, where the “breakaway keel” of earlier submarine designs was thus replaced. The filled middle tank was supposed to serve as a “ventilated keel”.
An innovation was the use of a rapid immersion tank. Filled with water in advance, it gave the submarine negative buoyancy, which significantly reduced the time of transition from the surface to the submerged position. When the submarine reached periscope depth, this tank was purged and the submarine acquired normal buoyancy, close to zero. If for a Bars-type submarine the transition from surface to underwater required at least 3 minutes, then for a Decembrist-type submarine 30 seconds were enough for this.
The "Decembrist" type submarine had 2 deck (superstructure) tanks, intended for navigation in a positional position.
They were very useful on Bars class submarines with their slow process of filling the main ballast tanks with centrifugal pumps. An urgent dive from a positional position in the presence of deck tanks required significantly less time, but with the transition to receiving the main ballast by gravity, the need for these tanks disappeared. On subsequent types of submarines (except for the Malyutka type submarine of series VI), deck tanks were abandoned.
Compressed air plays a special role on submarines. It is practically the only means for purging main ballast tanks in a submerged position. It is known that on the surface there is one cubic m of compressed air compressed to 100 atm can blow through approximately 100 tons of water, while at a depth of 100 m - only about 10 tons. For different purposes, submarines use compressed air of various pressures. Blowing through the main water ballast, especially during an emergency ascent, requires high-altitude air pressure. At the same time, for trim purposes, for the system of mechanical mixing of the electrolyte in the battery cells and normal ascent, lower air pressure can be used.
On the Decembrist type submarine, each of the two blowing systems (high and low pressure) had a pipeline with branches, one for 2 tanks. Air bypass to the other side was provided only through ventilation pipes. For a more uniform distribution of air along the sides, the exit non-return valves on the left and right sides alternated in a checkerboard pattern. In addition, they were equipped with limiting washers, with the help of which it was possible to achieve almost the same duration of blowing of all tanks along the length of the submarine. Ventilation valves separated along the sides were installed only on the pipes of tanks No. 3 and No. 4 in the area of a strong deckhouse, which prevented the connection of the tanks between the burs; the second valves of the same tanks were not separated. All these decisions were made by the designers of the Dekabrist class submarine quite consciously, and were not the result of any mistakes, although a similar point of view was often expressed later.
Analysis of the concept of submersion of a submarine to a particular depth and the duration of its stay there made it possible to introduce the concept of “working” and “maximum” diving depth. It was assumed that the submarine would be at the maximum depth only in cases of extreme necessity and for the shortest possible time, at the smallest speed or without speed, and in any case without trim.
At the working depth, it must be provided with complete freedom of maneuver for an unlimited time. Although with some limitation of trim angles.
The submarine "Dekabrist" was the first domestic submarine designed for a maximum diving depth of 90 m.
The first-born of Soviet submarine shipbuilding could not become a warship that meets the requirements of the time without modern equipment.
At the same time, it was impossible to go beyond the predetermined weight loads. Therefore, the number of dewatering pumps was halved, the leaded main cables were replaced with vulcanized ones, one main transverse bulkhead was replaced with a lighter one, the rotation speed of ship fans was increased by 1.5 times, etc.
As a result, the calculated displacement of the submarine "Dekabrist" coincided with the initial, design one, and by the time the construction of subsequent series of submarines began, in a matter of years, the technology for manufacturing mechanisms that were lighter in terms of mass characteristics had been mastered by our industry.
The disadvantage of the Decembrist type submarine should be considered the placement of the main fuel supply outside the durable hull (“fuel” in overload). Of the total fuel reserve of approximately 128 tons, only 39 tons were inside the durable hull, the remaining 89 tons were placed in four onboard ballast tanks Nos. 5,6,7,8. This made it possible to increase the cruising range at economic surface speed by 3.6 times compared to the Bars-class submarine. But the Second World War showed that such placement of fuel often led to a loss of submarine stealth. for violations of the tightness of the seams of the skin of the light hull during close explosions of depth or aircraft bombs or artillery shells.
It was possible to ensure the specified fuel autonomy of the Dekabrist type submarine of 28 days.
A fundamentally new system, never before used in domestic underwater shipbuilding, was the air regeneration system for the interiors of a Decembrist submarine - removing excess carbon dioxide and replenishing the loss of oxygen in the air, i.e. maintaining a favorable concentration of air mixture in the submarine. The need for this system arose in connection with the requirement to increase the duration of continuous stay under water to three days instead of one day for Bars-class submarines.
The air regeneration system maintained the autonomy of all compartments. It provided the possibility of continuous submarine stay under water for 72 hours.
At the request of the Navy operational-technical commission, much attention was paid to the battery maintenance conditions. Unlike the Bars-type submarines, the battery pits were made hermetically sealed, and the elements in them were placed in 6 rows with a longitudinal passage in the middle. The tightness of the pits guaranteed the protection of the batteries from seawater entering the submarine (above the deck flooring), which could cause a short circuit and the release of asphyxiating gas - chlorine. The height of the premises was sufficient for a person to pass through and service all elements. This required a significant expansion and increase in the height of the battery pits, which worsened the habitability of the residential and service premises located above them and caused difficulties in the placement of some mechanisms, drives and pipelines.
In addition, the increase in the center of gravity somewhat affected the stability of the submarine - their metacentric height in the surface position was about 30 cm.
It was far from simple to solve the problem of the main mechanisms for the Decembrist type submarine, which arose during the design of the first submarines of I.G. Bubnov, i.e. before the revolution. The limited volume of interior spaces, especially in height, made it difficult to use engines of the desired power.
For the Bars-class submarine, engines were ordered from Germany, but with the outbreak of World War I, their supply to Russia ceased. It was necessary to use diesel engines with 5 times less power, removed from the gunboats of the Amur Flotilla, which led to a decrease in surface speed to 11 knots instead of the designed 18.
However, the mass construction of more powerful engines for submarines in Tsarist Russia was never established.
After the revolution, purchasing engines specially designed for submarines abroad became impossible. At the same time, it turned out that the German company MAN, which carried out orders for the Russian fleet for the production of diesel engines before the First World War, began building diesel locomotives for which it adapted diesel engines previously intended for submarines. In the early 20s, it supplied several such engines for the first Soviet diesel locomotives "E-El-2". These engines could develop power up to 1200 hp. at 450 rpm. Within one hour. Their long-term operation was guaranteed with a power of 1100 hp. and 525 rpm. It was these that it was decided to use for the Decembrist-class submarines.
However, this compromise solution was to a certain extent a step back: the design of the Bars-class submarine included 2 x 1320 hp engines, although the displacement of these submarines was almost 1.5 times lower than the displacement of the Dekabrist-class submarine.
But there was no other way out. We had to reduce the surface speed by about one knot.
In 1926 - 1927 The domestic industry created a compressor non-reversible diesel engine for submarines of the "42 - B - 6" brand with a power of 1100 hp. Long-term tests have confirmed its reliability and efficiency. These diesel engines went into mass production and were then installed in twos on subsequent Series I submarines. They provided them with a surface speed of 14.6 knots.
The decrease in speed was also influenced by the fact that the propellers installed on the Dekabrist-class submarine were not optimal, because they were not selected experimentally, as was previously practiced during the construction of each warship.
High underwater speed at that time was not considered one of the main tactical elements of a submarine, therefore, when designing the Decembrist type submarine, the main attention was paid to increasing the cruising range at economic underwater speed.
For this purpose, special electric motors were created with two armatures of different power (525 hp and 25 hp for economic running). The battery was divided into 4 groups with the possibility of connecting them in series or parallel.
Each battery group contained 60 lead cells of the “DK” brand; the rated voltage on the main station buses could presumably vary from 120 V to 480 V. However, the upper limit of these stresses had to be abandoned very soon, because The industry could not yet guarantee the strength of electrical insulation in conditions of high indoor humidity. Therefore, the battery groups of the batteries on the Decembrist type submarines were connected in series only in pairs, the upper voltage limit was reduced to 240 V. The low-power armatures of both economic electric motors could be switched from a parallel connection to a serial connection, which led to a decrease in the voltage on their brushes to 60 volts while maintaining the full voltage in the field windings.
In this mode, an underwater speed of 2.9 knots was achieved within 52 hours. This corresponded to a completely unprecedented diving range of 150 miles!
Submarines of the "Decembrist" type could travel at this speed under water, without surfacing, the distance from the Luga Bay to the exit to the Baltic Sea, i.e. being in its operational zone, it could actually control the entire Gulf of Finland.
The main propeller electric motors of the Decembrist submarine made it possible to develop an underwater speed of about 9 knots for two hours. This met the requirements of the time, but was achieved only after long and hard work to improve the contours of the protruding part of the hull.
The main submarines of the "Decembrist" class were torpedoes. After the First World War 1914 - 1918 The length of torpedoes in all fleets of the world has increased by 1.5 times, the caliber has increased by 20%, and the mass of the warhead has increased by 3 times!.
By the time the construction of the Decembrist-class submarine began, there were no such torpedoes in the USSR; they began to be designed simultaneously with the submarine. It should be noted that these torpedoes were not available even by the end of the construction of the Decembrist-class submarines, which for a long time floated with gratings in the torpedo tubes, which made it possible to use 450 mm torpedoes for training firing.
The creation of a new 533 mm torpedo turned out to be a longer process than the design and construction of a submarine. Simultaneously with the submarine and torpedo, V.A. Skvortsov and I.M. Ioffe also designed torpedo tubes. Particular difficulties arose when developing a device for recharging them underwater. Those places where it was most convenient to place such a device were required for the installation of steering and capstan motors with their drives.
The artillery armament of the Decembrist-class submarine initially consisted of two 100-mm guns mounted on the deck of the superstructure in closed fairings that closed the smooth contours of the wheelhouse fence. But a discussion of the project in the operational-technical commission led to the conclusion that it was necessary to raise the bow gun above the deck to prevent it from being flooded by waves. In this regard, it was necessary to abandon the stern gun of the same caliber so that the submarine would not lose stability on the surface. This made it possible to install the bow gun, protected by a bulwark, at the level of the navigation bridge. Instead of a stern 100 mm gun, a 45 mm semi-automatic anti-aircraft gun was installed.
During the overhaul and modernization of the Decembrist type submarine in 1938 - 1941. The 100-mm gun, which cramped the already narrow bridge and made it difficult to see, especially when mooring, was again installed on the deck of the superstructure. This somewhat reduced the scope of roll and increased the stability of the submarine. At the same time, the configuration of the cabin was changed.
The steering device of the Decembrist type submarine, which ensured maneuvering of the submarine, consisted of one vertical rudder and two pairs of horizontal rudders. Electric and manual drives were used to shift the rudders.
The electric drive of the vertical rudder was controlled by regulating the excitation of the servo generator, which was driven into rotation at a constant speed by a DC electric motor paired with it. Its manual drive had 3 control posts: on the bridge, in the control center and in the aft compartment. All of them were connected to each other by roller drives and operated on a common differential clutch with an electric drive. This clutch created independence of the manual drive from the electric one and made it possible to switch from one control system to another without any switching.
The axis of the vertical rudder stock was tilted forward by 7 degrees. It was believed that when transferred on board, it would perform the work of horizontal rudders, helping to keep the submarine from floating in circulation. However, these assumptions did not materialize and the inclined vertical rudder was subsequently abandoned.
The control of the horizontal rudders was located only in the CPU and was connected to the end compartments by roller drives. Electric motors and manual steering wheels were installed in the CPU, and they were switched here using cam clutches.
The bow horizontal rudders could be folded along the side of the superstructure ("collapse") to reduce water resistance on large underwater passages and to protect against damage on a steep wave in the surface position, when the scope of heave increases. Their “rolling over and falling off” was carried out from the bow compartment. For this purpose, an electric motor was used, which served the capstan device and windlass of the Hall-type surface anchor.
In addition to the surface anchor, the Decembrist type submarine was also equipped with an underwater anchor - lead, mushroom-shaped, with a cable instead of an anchor chain. But his device turned out to be unsuccessful, which led to a curious situation during testing. When the submarine "Decembrist" stopped at anchor at a depth of 30 meters (at a sea depth of 50 m), the anchor cable jumped off the drum and became jammed. The submarine found itself “tied2 to the bottom. To break away, it needed to overcome the weight of the anchor, the resistance of the soil that quickly sucked in the anchor, and the weight of the column of water that pressed from above. A mushroom-shaped anchor has a great holding force and it is no coincidence that it is used as a dead anchor to hold floating vessels in their proper place lighthouses, buoys and other navigational and hydrographic landmarks. Only after a large bubble was put into the bow tank, the submarine "Dekabrist" jumped to the surface, but with such a trim on the bow (40 degrees), which far exceeded the norm acceptable according to the then standards. The mushroom-shaped anchor was retained on the Dekabrist-class submarine, but the submariners preferred not to use it.
For the first time in the world, Dekabrist-class submarines were equipped with a set of rescue equipment, alarms and communication with an emergency submarine, life support and crew rescue, and means for lifting the submarine to the surface.
After completion of the design work, the general arrangement of weapons, technical equipment and personnel placement on the Decembrist-class submarine, which had 7 compartments, was as follows:
The first (bow torpedo) compartment was, as already indicated, the largest in volume. It housed 6 torpedo tubes (three rows vertically, two rows horizontally) for 533 mm torpedoes. Each of them was a cast bronze pipe with hermetically sealed front and back covers. The front parts of the torpedo tubes exited the compartment through the end bulkhead of the durable hull into the bow permeable end of the light hull. In front of each torpedo tube there were niches covered with breakwater shields. They opened before the torpedo fired. Drives were used to open and close the front and rear covers and the breakwater shield. The torpedo was pushed out of the torpedo tube by compressed air with the front cover of the device open and the back cover closed.
6 spare torpedoes were stored on the racks. The compartment had a combined torpedo-loading device in the upper part, an electric motor that ensured the operation of the capstan, windlass of the surface anchor and bow horizontal rudders, and a provision tank. The first served to compensate for the weight of spent spare torpedoes and was filled by gravity with sea water from torpedo tubes or from overboard. The bow trim tank, like a similar stern tank, was intended for trimming submarines, in which it was able to submerge and maneuver freely under water.
The first compartment also served as living quarters for some of the personnel. This is how one of the commanders of the Decembrist-type submarine describes the bow compartment: “Most of the submariners were located in the first compartment - the most spacious on the Decembrist-type submarine. It also housed the personal crew’s dining room. The deck of the first compartment is lined with steel plates, which have soles The boots and boots were worn to a shine, and a light layer of diesel oil made them matte. In this compartment, 12 of the 14 torpedoes were located in hermetically sealed tubes - torpedo tubes, they were waiting for several short commands. rush to the side of the enemy ship. The remaining 6 torpedoes, placed on special racks, three on each side, were waiting for their turn due to the thick layer of dark brown grease, they looked very uncomfortable in the living compartment, despite the fact that the torpedoes were placed one above. on the other hand, they occupied a significant part of the room. Three-tier bunks were installed along the torpedoes, which collapsed during the day, which somewhat increased the free space. In the middle of the compartment there was a dining table, on which 3 more submariners slept at night. Dozens of valves various sizes and many pipelines completed the decoration of the first compartment."
An end ballast tank was placed in the bow of the light hull.
In the second compartment, in the lower part of the durable hull, in the battery pit (welded structure), there was the first group of 60-cell battery, above which there was a radio room and living quarters.
The third compartment housed 2 more groups of batteries, and above them were living quarters for the command staff, a galley, a wardroom and ventilation systems with electric fans for forced and natural ventilation of the compartments and battery pits. The double-breasted space was occupied by fuel tanks.
The fourth compartment was allocated to the central post, which was the main control post and survivability of the submarine. The control center was equipped here - a place where control devices for the submarine, its weapons and technical equipment are concentrated. For the first time in the domestic underwater shipbuilding, a centralized system for submersion and control of submarines was used.
At the bottom of the compartment there was an equalization tank and a rapid immersion tank. The first served to compensate for residual buoyancy for static balancing of the submarine at a given depth by receiving or pumping out sea water from it. With the help of the second tank, the minimum time for the submarine to reach a given depth during an urgent dive was ensured. When sailing at sea in a cruising position, the rapid submersion tank was always filled with sea water; in a submerged position, it was always drained. An artillery magazine was also located in the lower part of the compartment (120 shells of 100 mm caliber and 500 shells of 45 mm caliber). In addition, a sump pump and one of the blowers were installed in the compartment to blow compressed air through the main ballast tanks during ascent. The double-breasted space was occupied by the middle main ballast tank.
Above the compartment there was a cylindrical strong cabin with a diameter of 1.7 m with a spherical roof, which was part of a durable hull. On the Bars-class submarine, the control room was located in such a control room. But during the design of the Decembrist-class submarine, by decision of the operational-technical commission, it was transferred to the central control center. It was supposed to protect it in this way in the event of an enemy ramming attack. For the same purpose, the cabin was attached to the strong hull not directly, but through a special coaming (vertical sheets bordering the base of the cabin along the perimeter), connected to the strong hull by two rows of rivets.
The wheelhouse itself was attached to the coaming with only one row of the same rivets. In the event of a ramming blow delivered to the wheelhouse, one could count on the breakage of only a weak rivet seam, which protected the durable hull from violating its waterproofness.
The cabin had two entrance hatches: the top one - heavy for access to the navigation bridge and the bottom one - for communication with the central post. Thus, if necessary, the cabin could be used as an airlock for personnel to reach the surface. At the same time, it provided rigid support for the commander and anti-aircraft periscopes (the first for inspecting the horizon, the second for inspecting the air sphere).
The fifth compartment, like the second and third, was a battery compartment. It housed the fourth battery group, surrounded by lubricating oil tanks (they were usually called oil tanks). Above the battery pit there was a living quarters for the foremen, and on board there was a second blower for the ascent of the submarine.
In the sixth compartment, internal combustion engines were installed - diesel engines, which served as the main surface engines. There were also disconnecting couplings for two propeller shafts, lubricating oil tanks, and auxiliary mechanisms. An entrance hatch for the engine crew was equipped in the upper part of the diesel compartment. Like the other entrance hatches, it had a double lock (top and bottom) and an elongated coaming (shaft) protruding into the compartment, i.e. could serve as an escape hatch for personnel to reach the surface.
All six compartments differed from each other by spherical bulkheads, and the bulkhead between the sixth and seventh compartments was made flat.
The seventh (aft torpedo) compartment housed the main propeller electric motors, which were the main underwater propulsion engines, and economic propulsion electric motors, which ensured long-term navigation under water at economical speed, as well as their control stations. In this electric motor compartment, 2 aft torpedo tubes (without spare torpedoes) were installed horizontally in a row. They had breakwaters in a lightweight body. The compartment also contained steering gears and auxiliary mechanisms, a stern trim tank, and a combined torpedo-loading and access hatch in the upper part.
At the aft end of the light hull there was a second end ballast tank.
On November 3, 1928, the lead submarine of series I "Decembrist" left the slipway and took to the water. The parade platoon of the Submarine Training Unit took part in the ceremony. During the completion of the ship afloat, many errors were identified that were made during the design of the first Soviet submarine, but most of them were corrected in a timely manner.
Sea acceptance tests of the Decembrist type submarine were carried out by a state commission chaired by the authorized representative of the Standing Commission for Testing and Acceptance of Newly Built and Overhauled Ships, Y.K. Zubarev.
During the first test of the submarine "Decembrist" in May 1930, the acceptance committee was seriously concerned about the heeling that occurred during the dive after opening the kingstons of the main ballast tanks (with the ventilation valves closed). One of the reasons was the lack of weight control during the construction of the submarines, and they were overloaded. As a result, their stability turned out to be underestimated compared to the design, and the influence of negative stability on diving and ascent was significant. Another reason was a gross violation of the instructions for diving and ascent developed for the Dekabrist type submarine, which required taking main ballast water into all tanks simultaneously, which ensured the greatest weight stability. Meanwhile, when filling only two pairs of ballast tanks, as was done during mooring tests, the draft of the Dekabrist submarine did not reach the level of their roofs (stringers). Consequently, there was a free surface of water in the tanks and its overflow from side to side was inevitable, because the ventilation pipes of both sides communicated with each other with the valves closed. The air in the tanks passed from one side to the other in the direction opposite to the direction of the water. Negative stability eventually reached its maximum.
Undoubtedly, this could have been avoided if its designers had participated in the mooring tests of the Dekabrist submarine.
But by this time, B.M. Malinin, E.E. Kruger and S.A. Bazilevsky were repressed on false charges of enemy activity. They had to investigate the reasons for the situation that developed during the tests in an environment that was fundamentally far from creative. However, as B.M. Malinin later noted, in the end S.A. Bazilevsky developed (in a prison cell) the theory of immersion and ascent of one-and-a-half-hull and double-hull submarines, which was his indisputable scientific work.
To eliminate the detected defects (design and construction), longitudinal bulkheads were installed in the deck ballast tanks and separate ventilation of the main ballast tanks was introduced. In addition, high-pressure compressors and chain anchors were removed and additional floating volumes (floats) were strengthened. It became clear that there was a need for a control valve on the low-pressure air distribution box, the presence of which made it possible to regulate its supply to the tanks on each side, which was required for the submarine to surface in heavy seas.
During one of the dives of the submarine "Decembrist" to a considerable depth, a strong blow was unexpectedly heard from below. The submarine lost its buoyancy and lay on the ground, and at a depth slightly exceeding the maximum. After an urgent ascent, it turned out that the kingston of the rapid-dive tank, which opened inward, was pressed away from its saddle by outboard pressure. Before this, the empty tank spontaneously filled with water, which rushed into the tank under high pressure and, which caused a hydraulic shock. A design flaw in the valves of the rapid immersion tank was eliminated - in the closed position, they began to be pressed by water pressure to their sockets.
On November 18, 1930, a welcoming telegram was received from Moscow: “To the Revolutionary Council of the Naval Forces of the Baltic Sea. Director of Baltic Water. Commander of the submarine “Dekabrist”. I congratulate the Naval Forces of the Baltic Sea on the entry into service of the submarine “Dekabrist” - the first-born of the new Soviet shipbuilding and technology. I am sure that in the hands of the revolutionary sailors of the Baltic “Decembrist” will be a formidable weapon against our class enemies and in future battles for socialism the Chief of the Naval Forces R. Muklevich will cover his red flag with glory.”
On October 11 and November 14, 1931, the submarines Narodovolets and Krasnogvardeets entered service. The commanders of the first Soviet-built submarines were B.A.Sekunov, M.K.Nazarov and K.N.Griboedov, mechanical engineers M.I.Matrosov, N.P.Kovalev and K.L.Grigaitis.
Since the spring of 1930, the command staff of the submarine forces brigade of the Baltic Fleet began studying the Decembrist-class submarines. The classes were led by delivery mechanic G.M. Trusov.
Also in 1931, the submarines "Revolutionary" (January 5), "Spartakovets" (May 17) and "Jacobinets" (June 12) were accepted into the Black Sea Naval Forces. Their crews led by commanders V.S. Surin, M.V. Lashmanov, N.A. Zhimarinsky, mechanical engineers T.I. Gushlevsky, S.Ya. Kozlov actively participated in the construction of the submarine, testing of mechanisms, systems and devices , D.G.Vodyanitsky.
The crews of the Decembrist-class submarine initially numbered 47 people, and then 53 people.
The creation of the "Decembrist" type submarine - the first double-hull submarine of riveted design - was a genuine revolutionary leap in domestic submarine shipbuilding. Compared to the Bars-class submarines - the last in pre-revolutionary shipbuilding - they had the following advantages:
- cruising range at economic surface speed increased by 3.6 times;
- full surface speed increased by 1.4 times;
- cruising range at economic underwater speed increased by 5.4 times;
- working depth of immersion increased by 1.5 times;
- diving time was reduced by 6 times;
- the reserve of buoyancy, which ensures unsinkability, has increased by 2 times;
- the total mass of the warhead of the full stock of torpedoes has increased approximately 10 times;
- the total mass of an artillery salvo increased 5 times.
Some tactical and technical elements of the Dekabrist class submarine exceeded the design specifications. For example, he received an underwater speed of not 9, but 9.5 knots; the cruising range in the surface position at full speed is not 1500, but 2570 miles; cruising range at economic speed on the surface is not 3500, but 8950 miles; in underwater - not 110, but 158 miles. On board the Dekabrist class submarine there were 14 torpedoes (and not 4, but 6 bow torpedo tubes), 120 100 mm caliber shells and 500 45 mm caliber shells. The submarine could remain at sea for up to 40 days, its underwater autonomy in terms of energy reserves reached three days.
In the fall of 1932, the submarine "Dekabrist" was subjected to special research tests to accurately identify all its tactical and technical elements. The tests were carried out by a commission chaired by Y.K. Zubarev, his deputy was A.E. Kuzaev (Mortekhupr), from the shipbuilding industry N.V. Alekseev, V.I. Govorukhin, A.Z. Kaplanovsky, M.A. Rudnitsky, V.F. Klinsky, V.N. Peregudov, Ya.Ya. Peterson, P.I. Serdyuk, G.M. Trusov and others. S.A. Bazilevsky, who was under arrest, took part in the tests.
The test results confirmed that the Decembrist-class submarines, in terms of their technical characteristics and lower displacement, were not inferior to similar British and American submarines. The British began in 1927 the construction of Oberon-class submarines (1475 / 2030 tons), which had 6 bow and 2 stern tubes (14 torpedoes in total) and one 102 mm gun. Their only advantage is their surface speed of 17.5 knots. It is more plausible that the surface speed did not exceed 16 knots (coefficient C = 160.
TACTICAL AND TECHNICAL ELEMENTS OF THE "DECEMBRIST" TYPE PLUS
Displacement - 934 t / 1361 t
Length 76.6 m
Maximum width - 6.4 m
Draught on the surface - 3.75 m
Number and power of main engines:
- diesel 2 x 1100 hp
- electric 2 x 525 hp.
Full speed 14.6 knots / 9.5 knots
Cruising range at full speed 2570 miles (16.4 kts)
Cruising range economic speed 8950 miles (8.9 knots)
Submerged 158 miles (2.9 kts)
Autonomy 28 days (then 40)
Working immersion depth 75 m
Maximum diving depth 90 m
Armament: 6 bow TA, 2 stern TA
Total torpedo ammunition 14
Artillery weapons:
1 x 100 mm (120 rounds),
1 x 45 mm (500 rounds)
In September 1934, the submarines were assigned the letter-numeric names D-1, D-2, D-3, D-4, D-5, D-6. In the same year, submarine D-1 (commander V.P. Karpunin) and submarine D-2 (commander L.M. Reisner) attempted to make a trip to Novaya Zemlya. In the Barents Sea they were met by a fierce storm - the “Novaya Zemlya Bora”. The submarine had to take refuge in the Kola Bay.
In 1935, the submarine D-1 visited Belushya Bay on Novaya Zemlya. In 1936, the submarines D-1 and D-2 reached the Kara Sea for the first time while diving through the Matochkin Shar Strait. Returning to the Barents Sea, on August 22-23 they visited Russian Harbor, located on the northern coast of Novaya Zemlya.
Then PL-2 and D-3 (commander M.N. Popov) made a high-latitude voyage to Bear Island (Björnö) and the Spitsbergen Bank. After this, the submarine D-2 headed to the Lofoten Islands, located off the western coast of Norway. The hike continued in the conditions of a severe storm with force up to 9 points. During this autonomous voyage, the submarine D-2 traveled 5803 miles on the surface and 501 miles under water, the submarine D-3 - a total of 3673.7 miles.
In the winter of 1938, the submarine D-3 took part in an expedition to remove the first ever drifting polar station "North Pole" from the ice floe, led by I.D. Papanin. Having completed the task, the submarine D-3 returned to base, leaving 2410 miles astern.
On November 21, 1938, she left the Polyarny submarine D-1 under the command of Art. Lieutenant M.P.Avgustinovich. For more than 44 days, her autonomous navigation continued along the route Tsyp-Navolok - about. Vardø - North Cape - o. Bear - oh. Hope (Hepen) - Fr. Mezhdusharsky (Earth) - Kolguev Island - Cape Kann Nos - Cape Holy Nose - about. Kildin. In total, the submarine traveled 4841 miles, of which 1001 miles were under water.
In April-May 1939, submarine D-2 under the command of Art. Lieutenant A.A. Zhukov, providing radio communication to V.K. Kokkinaki’s plane during its non-stop flight to the USA, left near Iceland from the northern part of the Atlantic.
Submarine D-3, which was successively commanded by lieutenant captain F.V. Konstantinov and captain 3rd rank M.A. Bibeev, sank 8 enemy transports with a total displacement of 28,140 brt and damaged one transport (3,200 brt). She became the first Red Banner Guards ship in the history of the Soviet Navy.
The submarine D-2 conducted combat operations in the Baltic. In October 1939, she arrived via the White Sea-Baltic Canal to Leningrad from the North for major repairs. The outbreak of war prevented her return to the Northern Fleet. In August 1941, she was enlisted in the Red Banner Baltic Fleet. She is one of the few Soviet submarines that operated in the area of the Baltic Maritime Theater farthest from Kronstadt and Leningrad - to the west of the island. Bornholm. Under the command of Captain 2nd Rank R.V. Lindeberg, the submarine D-2 sank the transports Jacobus Fritzen (4090 grt) and Nina (1731 grt) and disabled the railway ferry Deutschland (2972 grt) for a long time with a torpedo attack. , plying between German and Swedish ports.
Remarkable combat successes were achieved by the crews of the submarines D-4 ("Revolutionary") and D-5 ("Spartakovets") of the Black Sea Fleet, which were successively commanded by Lieutenant Commander I.Ya. Trofimov. 5 transports with a total displacement of 16,157 brt were destroyed, including Boy Feddersen (6,689 brt), Santa Fe (4,627 brt) and Varna (2,141 brt).
In total, the Dekabrist class submarine has 15 sunken ships (49,758 GRT) and two damaged (6,172 GRT) enemy transport ships.
One of the Decembrist-class submarines, D-2 (Narodovolets), served the Navy for more than half a century. In the post-war period, it was converted into a training station where submariners of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet were trained. On May 8, 1969, a memorial plaque was unveiled on it: “The first-born of Soviet shipbuilding - the submarine Narodovolets D-2 was laid down in 1927 in Leningrad. It entered service in 1931. From 21933 to 1939 it was part of Northern Military Flotilla From 1941 to 1945, it conducted active military operations against the fascist invaders in the Baltic."
Submarine D-2, now installed on the shore of the Neva Bay near the Sea of Glory Square on Vasilievsky Island in St. Petersburg, is an eternal monument to Soviet designers and engineers, scientists and production workers, heroic Baltic sailors. Ctrl+Enter
The memorial complex-museum "Submarine D-2 "Narodovolets" is one of the most unique attractions of St. Petersburg.
The museum's exposition is dedicated to the history of the submarine D-2, the history of the Decembrist project, as well as the actions of Soviet submariners in the Baltic.
Various documents and images, small arms of Baltic sailors and boat guns, ship models, various equipment and household items of sailors are presented.
But the most important thing in the museum is the boat itself.
"Narodovolets" is a one-of-a-kind monument to the history of domestic shipbuilding in the 1920s.
It may not be the most famous or the most successful, but the most important thing is that it is well preserved, not cut into metal in the 60s. Beautifully, lovingly restored, giving a complete idea of the structure of such ships, of the heroic service of submariners.
For those interested in the history of the Navy, the history of the Great Patriotic War, and simply technology, the museum is a must-visit.
Submarine D-2 "Narodovolets"
History of the submarine D-2
The boats of this project were the first built in our country after the October Revolution and were significantly superior to the submarine designs of the Russian Empire.
The lead boat of the series was laid down in 1927 according to the design of the design bureau headed by shipbuilding engineer Boris Mikhailovich Malinin (consultants A.N. Krylov, P.F. Papkovich and Yu.A. Shimansky).
Submarines of the "Decembrist" type were created on the basis domestic experience and theoretical developments taking into account the achievements of world shipbuilding. The submarine "Decembrist-1" became part of the Baltic Fleet on November 12, 1930.
Performance characteristics of the series boats:
Displacement: surface 933 tons, submerged 1354 tons; length 76 m; width 6.4 m; draft 3.8 m.
Engine power: two diesel engines 1619 kW (2200 hp), two electric motors 736 kW (1000 hp).
Speed: surface 14.7 knots (27.2 km/h), submerged 9 knots (16.7 km/h).
Cruising range: surface at a speed of 9.5 knots (17.6 km/h) 7,000 miles (13,000 km), submerged at a speed of 3 knots (5.6 km/h) up to 150 miles (278 km).
Armament: 6 bow and 2 stern torpedo tubes (caliber - 533 mm), 2 guns (100 and 45 mm), 1 anti-aircraft machine gun; crew 53 people.
The design of the Dekabrist-class submarine was significantly different from pre-revolutionary submarines: a double-hull design was used with the strong hull divided by bulkheads into waterproof compartments, the battery pits were sealed, the ventilation of the double-hull ballast tanks was separate, and a quick submersion tank was installed.
Submarines of the "Decembrist" type operated successfully in the Great Patriotic War. A total of 6 Project D submarines were built.
During the Great Patriotic War, the boat made 4 military campaigns with a total duration of 135 days.
"Narodovolets" carried out 12 torpedo attacks, during which 19 torpedoes were fired.
Reliably known victories: on October 14, 1942, the transport “Jacobus Fritzen” was sunk, on October 19, 1942, the railway ferry “Deutschland” was seriously damaged.
In 1956, the submarine was turned into a survivability training station.
In 1967, a group of veteran submariners sent a letter to the Krasnaya Zvezda newspaper with a proposal to turn the D-2 into a museum.
On March 5, 1987, the D-2 submarine was finally removed from the Navy lists. Restoration repairs have begun at the Kronstadt Marine Plant.
On September 2, 1993, the grand opening of the Memorial Complex-Museum “Submarine D-2 Narodovolets” took place on the shore of Vasilyevsky Island.
Photos of the submarine and museum exhibits
B-24PL nose gun, 100 mm caliber.
After the external inspection we move inside the boat. We begin the inspection from the stern, from the seventh compartment.
Stern 533-mm torpedo tubes.
The main switchboard station, on the left is the “remote control” for battery charging.
Tapping table. Used for communication through battened hatches.
6th compartment, diesel. 2 diesel engines from MAN, 1100 hp each. every. Later boats in the series were already equipped with our diesel engines.
5th compartment. The boat's gyrocompass is installed in it (visible on the right). You can see the stairs to the hold, which used to be filled with batteries. Now it is part of the museum's exhibition.
We move on to the fourth compartment - the central post, the command post of the boat.
Navigator's cabin.
By the way, a latrine is an overhang on the bow of a sailing ship, under the bowsprit, for installing bow decorations. Latrines for sailors were installed on the same overhang. The wind is blowing into the stern of a sailing ship...
The first compartment is the main striking power of the submarine. Six 533 mm torpedo tubes. 12 torpedoes - 6 loaded and 6 more stored in the compartment. Most of the crew lived here.
Torpedo tubes.
Tables, bunks and torpedoes.
Could you sleep hugging a torpedo on a surface 40 cm wide?
Exhibition in the hold of the boat.
Batteries. They filled most of the hold.
Naval flag of the submarine D-2.
We leave the boat and go to the museum. Collected in the museum large number documents on the history of submarine warfare in the Baltic. Various relics are kept.
"Decembrist" (the ship received the letter-numeric designation D-1 in September 1934) was accepted into the MSBM on November 18, 1930, and on August 5, 1933 - into the Northern Military Flotilla (after the transfer of three boats of the same type - D- 1, D-2 and D-3 - to the North along the White Sea-Baltic Canal, which took place in June-July of the same year). In the North, a separate division was formed from these three boats (K.N. Griboyedov was appointed commander), which laid the foundation for the submarine forces of the Northern Fleet.
In 1935, D-1, under the command of Captain 3rd Rank V.P. Karpunin, visited Belushya Bay on Novaya Zemlya, and the following year, for the first time in the history of diving, together with D-2, passed through the Matochkin Shar Strait. On August 18, both boats reached the Kara Sea, but, encountering ice fields, were forced to return. Returning to the Barents Sea, D-1 and D-2, following along the western shores of Novaya Zemlya, entered Russian Harbor on August 21. We had to leave the harbor by overcoming the Arctic ice. Having traveled 3094 miles during the trip, on September 2 D-1 returned to the Polyarny naval base.
From September 23, 1936 to November 8, 1937, the boat underwent major repairs and modernization.
When on February 4, 1938, a submarine brigade of two divisions was formed in the Northern Fleet, the command of which was taken over by the first commander of the “Decembrist”, captain 1st rank K.N. Griboyedov, and entered the 1st division along with the same type D-2 and D-3 D-1.
September 21, 1938 submarine under the command of Art. Lieutenant M.P. Avgustinovich left Polyarny on a 44-day autonomous voyage along the route Cape Tsyp-Navolok - island. Vardø - North Cape - o. Bear - oh. Hopes - Fr. Mezhdusharsky - Fr. Kolguev - m. Kanin Nos - m. Svyatoy Nos - o. Kildin - Kola Bay. Having covered 4841 miles on the surface and 1001 miles submerged, the D-1 was submerged for a total of 11 days, and on October 31, it completed a 24-hour submerged journey without air regeneration. During the year, the submarine spent 120 days at sea, traveling more than 10,000 miles, of which 1,200 were under water. Without exaggeration, this should be considered a record achievement for that time.
From April 15 to September 5, 1939, D-1 underwent ongoing repairs, from which the boat left on September 1 (two other submarines of the division were undergoing major repairs in Leningrad at that time). By that time, D-1 had already sailed 1540 hours, which significantly exceeded the norm (1200 hours). In terms of the level of combat training (BP), D-1, naturally (due to the repairs being carried out), was in the 2nd line.
On October 29, 1939, Captain-Lieutenant F.M. Eltishchev, who had previously commanded Shch-403 in the same theater, was appointed commander of D-1. F.M. Eltishchev was not yet allowed to independently control his new ship, so several times the boat went to sea with an “exported” commander.
With the beginning of the Soviet-Finnish War, for 11 days (from November 30 to December 10, 1939), the D-1 was continuously on one-hour readiness, which was later replaced by four-hour readiness. On January 2, 1940, the boat went to sea to perform patrol duty at position No. 2, located in the North Cape area. From January 3 to January 17, the submarine continuously remained in its position. According to the boat commander, the patrol position was chosen well, because “one could observe the passage of ships both along the coast and when leaving the fiords.” During the patrol duty, no movement of military or merchant ships was noticed, with the exception of two motorboats fishing both in the position itself and outside it. Position No. 2, the submarine commander believed, could be normally serviced in winds up to 8 points and waves up to 7 points (in case of stronger waves, the boat had to leave the position into storm squares). And since the position was very close to the coast, it did not meet these requirements.
D-1 combat training proceeded normally, emergency exercises and specialty training were conducted. At the same time, the crew was working on task No. 2 for the KPL-38. In total, during the trip, 2833 miles were covered above water and 175 miles underwater, and 11 dives were made. The transition to the base took place from January 18 to 19.
From January 20 to 21, the crew rested, after which the submarine underwent mid-term repairs for seven days. On January 29, the boat was switched to four-hour readiness, and from February 10, to one-hour readiness. On February 17, D-1 again entered combat service in the Varde area.
Arriving at the position on February 18, the boat remained there until February 27 inclusive. During this time, the weather conditions at the position were very severe: wind - north-west force 6, at times up to 10-11 force, wave - 7-8 force. From a depth of 10 meters, as the commander noted, the boat was simply thrown to the surface.
Surfacing on February 20, Lieutenant Commander F.M. Eltishchev saw in Norwegian territorial waters, two miles from the coast, a TR heading 300°. It was not possible to determine his nationality. On February 23 and 26, a minor breakdown occurred: the Fedoritsky coupling failed (the crosspiece broke). The personnel managed to repair the coupling. "Decembrist" left the position on February 28, heading to the base.
According to the submarine commander, the main task (reconnaissance of the Norwegian coast) was only partially completed, because due to a strong storm, D-1 was forced to stay 10-15 miles from the coast. During its combat service, the submarine covered 1,339 miles surfaced and 37 miles submerged.
After returning to the base, from February 29 to March 2, rest was arranged for the D-1 personnel, and from March 3 to 13, the submariners were engaged in replacing AB.
After the end of hostilities, from March 27 to April 7, D-1 again carried out patrol duty in the North Cape-Varde area.
At first glance, the power supply of the D-1 crew in 1940 proceeded normally (in any case, it was carried out in the same way on all submarines). But if you look more closely, you can find obvious violations in the sequence of passage of KPL-38.
So, on March 10, 1940, the brigade commander, Captain 2nd Rank D.A. Pavlutsky, submitted a written report to the SF Armed Forces, in which he petitioned for the admission of the D-1 commander, Lieutenant Commander F.M. Eltishchev, to independently control the boat and further complete the tasks of the KPL- 38 as having completed tasks Nos. 1 and 2. The Fleet Armed Forces, by its order No. 091 of March 25, 1940, granted the brigade commander’s petition. In fact, task No. 2 (it included practicing diving and ascent, underwater passage, urgent diving and diving) was completed only in June-July 1940. With a rating of “Good”, the task was accepted on July 11, 1940 by the commander of the 1st DPL captain 2nd rank M.P.Avgustinovich - however, not completely, without passing exercises No. 2g and 2d (diving). Thus, wishful thinking, the command actually “pushed” the unprepared submarine into the 1st line.
And already on May 22, captain 2nd rank D.A. Pavlutsky submitted a report to the SF Armed Forces with a request to transfer D-1 to the 1st line. But here the brigade commander was unlucky: from June 15 to 17, 1940, a commission of the Navy Combat Training Directorate, which checked the state of the brigade’s BP, revealed a number of gross violations committed during the passage of the CPL. In particular, it was found that D-1 was not properly prepared, so the commission “removed her from being transferred to the 1st line.”
At a meeting of the Supreme Council of the Northern Fleet, chaired by Vice Admiral G.I. Levchenko, the brigade commander tried to accuse the commission of bias and bias, allegedly manifested during the inspection, and stated that the commission’s instructions were not at all binding for him. Unfortunately, the Armed Forces, represented by Rear Admiral V.P. Drozd and Divisional Commissioner N.K. Smirnov, did not draw the proper conclusions regarding D.A. Pavlutsky, although the deputy. The commander of the BPL for political affairs, regimental commissar I.I. Pekker, recognized all the commission’s conclusions as absolutely correct.
Ignoring the commission's conclusions, the brigade commander at the beginning of August sent D-1 on a test torpedo attack on task No. 13 (attack on a ship traveling on alternating courses). This task is performed only by boats of the 1st line, so captain-lieutenant F.M. Eltishchev turned out to be completely unprepared for its implementation. The release of torpedoes was delayed, and the boat was forced to return to base.
By the way, cases of overestimation and presentation of unprepared submarines for transfer to the 1st line also occurred on other ships of the brigade. The UBP Navy Commission, during a repeat inspection that took place on August 16-17, 1940, noted the failure to comply with most of the instructions of the June commission. However, Captain 2nd Rank D.A. Pavlutsky continued to violate the sequence of BP of his brigade’s boats.
Meanwhile, D-1 (from August 22 to October 10) was undergoing routine repairs at the Red Horn floating base: tank ventilation valves, high-pressure air compressor inlet hatches, as well as bilge pumps and diesel engines were repaired. On October 22, the submarine tested the mechanisms, did a test dive, and made a sign. At this exit, the commander and art. The D-1 mechanical engineer was absent (on vacation), and therefore was replaced by the D-3 commander and the divisional mechanical engineer. In addition, the commander of the 1st submarine, captain 3rd rank M.I. Gadzhiev, was on board.
By order of the commander of the Northern Fleet, Rear Admiral A.G. Golovko No. 0432 dated October 25 (which was based on the report of the commander of the BPL No. 1284 dated October 21), D-1 was declared to have entered the campaign. After this, the submarine did not dive until November 13, but on November 1 it went out to determine and destroy the deviation of the magnetic compass.
By order of the fleet No. 0448 of November 6, 1940, it was announced that the D-1 won the BPL championship for the best warhead-4. On the same day, the boat arrived at the Murmansk roadstead to participate in the celebration of the 23rd anniversary of the October Revolution. On November 12, the submarine at the base was inspected by the technical commission of the Northern Fleet headquarters, which found its technical condition to be satisfactory.
On November 13, D-1 was scheduled to prepare for the test on task No. 2d (diving) KPL-38, after which she was supposed to go to Eina Bay to meet with the Umba Management Company. A joint exit was planned for November 14, during which the submarine brigade commander was to be on the Umba, and the commander of the 1st submarine and the divisional mechanical engineer were to be on the D-1. It was supposed, after a preliminary test, to pass the test for exercise No. 2d with actual diving.
Despite the fact that the submarine was under repair for about two months, and its commander was on vacation all this time, the D-1 was sent to a test site with depths of over 200 m without sufficiently checking the entire submersion-ascent system and the reliability of the tightness of the durable hull and tanks. At the same time, the brigade commander did not take into account the fact that back on June 12, 1940, unauthorized filling of the pulp and paper plant occurred on the D-1, and the accident was prevented only by timely blowing of the air-pressure unit. A serious violation was also the fact that before going to sea, the commanders of the warhead-3, warhead-5 were absent from the ship (and the senior mechanical engineer of the submarine was not replaced by a divisional specialist) and the junior commander in charge of the pipelines of the airborne system.
On November 13, 1940 at 8.58 D-1 under the command of Lieutenant Commander F.M. Eltishchev left the Main Base and headed to Motovskaya Bay, to training ground No. 6. According to the order of the UAV commander, the boat commander was supposed to check and practice diving tables at the training ground from 13.00 to 15.00.
The entire transition from Polyarny to the test site was observed by SNiS posts. At 13.17, post No. 113 (at Cape Vyev-Navolok) reported that D-1 had dived along the wheelhouse fence at a bearing of 330° at a distance of 60 cables, heading W. At 13.30, the same post observed that D-1 had dived under the periscope on bearing 335° distance 70 cab. the same course. At 13.45, post No. 111 (at Cape Sharapov) saw D-1 under a periscope at a bearing of 160° at a distance of 17 cabs. heading S-W.
From that moment on, the boat was no longer observed by the posts. The signal about the dive from the submarine was received at 13.30. At 14.00, the brigade commander on the Umba left Polyarny and at 19.00 arrived at Eina Guba, where D-1 was not found. The brigade commander asked his NTTT M.P. Avgustinovich in Polyarny about the location of the submarine, receiving the answer that there was no information from D-1 since 13.30, i.e. after giving the dive signal. Having no reports until 18.00, the NS requested D-1 by radio, showing its place. At the same time, the operational duty officer of the Northern Fleet headquarters requested all SNiS posts regarding D-1. But the boat did not respond to any requests.
After D-1 did not answer the RTS call in Polyarny at 18.40, the radiogram for it was repeated several times, until 22.22. At 23.15 NSh of the fleet, Rear Admiral S.G. Kucherov urgently ordered D-1 by radio to show his place and gave instructions to all ships at sea (K-1, K-2 and M-171 were there) and SNiS posts to constantly call the boat . To listen to training ground No. 6, the fleet commander sent K-2. At 23.40, “Umba” with a submarine brigade commander on board left Eina Guba and headed to training ground No. 6.
The fleet's EPRON assets were put on immediate readiness. At 1.20 on November 14, two MO-4 type boats (Nos. 17 and 18) were sent to inspect the test site and the coast of Motovsky Bay. At 1.44, the TFR “Tuman” was sent there with rescue equipment. And finally, on 2.22, the EM “Stremitely” came out to Motovskaya Bay to clarify the situation, with the commander of the Northern Fleet himself on board. Two hours later, Shch-402 went in search of D-1, and three hours later - D-3.
Throughout the night from November 13 to 14, an intensive search was carried out in Motovsky Bay, in which the Swift, Tuman, Umba, hunting boats and K-1 took part. During the search activities, the sea was listened to with a direction finder from K-1 and the water surface was illuminated with searchlights.
At 10.30, two MBR-2 seaplanes took off to survey the Motovsky Bay and its coast.
At dawn, the inspection of the bay by surface ships continued. At about 10.00, in the area of Cape Sharapov, the ships discovered a large oil slick, a lifebuoy, small wooden fragments and an insulating plug. The depth in this place ranged from 190 to 216 m.
By 14.00, TC No. 890 and TC No. 891 arrived at range No. 6 and immediately began trawling the area where the oil slick was discovered. By the evening they were joined by the Toros, Shtil, RT-80 and RT-69.
Trawling work was carried out under. general management of the deputy NSh Northern Fleet Captain 1st Rank M.N. Popov, and the commander of the TSC division, Captain-Lieutenant P.V. Panfilov, was responsible for trawling the area and searching with a metal detector. The entire search area was divided into three parts (northern, middle and southern), after which technical units Nos. 890 and 891 swept it, following an O-W course. Then the area was again divided into three parts (eastern, middle and western), and the trucks passed it on the N-S course. Trawling was carried out using Schultz trawls without buoys, with extended tugs. SKR “Tuman” worked with the metal detector. When the trawl touched a foreign object, a pole was placed and the location was precisely determined, after which the TFR “Fog” was called to listen, and the area was no longer trawled. When a significant mass of metal was detected, “Fog” also set a milestone.
From November 14 to 18, four thick oil stains and various debris were discovered in training ground No. 6 of the TSCH, which were subsequently identified as belonging to D-1. The trawls repeatedly (at least five times) hit foreign objects. In these places, metal detectors recorded the presence of a large mass of metal.
On November 17, at the naval base, the Polar investigator of the Military Prosecutor's Office of the Northern Fleet, military lawyer V. Pisklov, in the presence of a member of the Armed Forces, political instructor E.N. Markov, the flagship mechanical engineer of the fleet headquarters, engineer-captain 3rd rank M. Slinko and the investigator of the Special Department of the NKVD, state security sergeant Evseev, carefully examined the objects, raised from the surface of the sea in the disaster area. A total of 18 pieces of evidence were recorded.
The first item on the list was “liquid collected at the scene in the amount of 1 bucket and 1 can,” which in appearance strongly resembled diesel fuel. This was followed by a large group of objects (or their fragments) made of wood or cork. The most interesting of them were: “half a lifebuoy painted red and white, a whole lifebuoy, fragments of pressed sheet cork of irregular shape, an individual first aid package with Russian text, a pine block broken off at the ends and painted with anti-acid paint, a pine block, broken off at one end, with the letter “P” applied, covered with anti-acid paint, interspersed with four lead fragments and a board (in appearance - from AB).” Having examined these items, naval experts unanimously identified them as belonging to D-type submarines. Some items were identified quite accurately: for example, a wedge from the AB group IV sheathing.
The nature of the damage to some items led to the idea of a strong internal explosion that took place on the submarine, which occurred in the area of compartment V, because some items were clearly from this compartment.
Based on the results of search activities carried out from November 13 to 18, 1940, and the study of the raised debris, on November 18, the SF Armed Forces sent the People's Commissar of the USSR Navy, Admiral N.G. Kuznetsov, a “Report on the sinking of the submarine D-1 on November 13, 1940.”
The fleet command immediately put forward three possible versions of the death of the boat. The first, about the detonation of a submarine on a drifting mine, was considered unlikely by the SF Armed Forces, because the mine explosion could be clearly visible from the SNiS posts at Cape Sharapov and Vyev-Navolok. In addition, the explosion could be seen and heard by the Gremyashchiy and Stremitelny EMs, which were located that day near D-1, in training ground No. 5. However, neither the SNiS posts nor the ships recorded any underwater explosions.
To be fair, it is worth noting that from February 8 to November 15, 1940, in the area of Motovsky Bay - Kildinsky Reach of the NK and submarines, 11 detections of floating mines left over from the Soviet-Finnish war were recorded. All noticed drifting mines, as a rule, were shot, and. this did not lead to dire consequences.
The second version - a collision of D-1 with some kind of NK, was also not excluded, but in this case it was out of the question. The fact is that in training ground No. 6 until 12.43 on November 13 there were EMs “Spiritual” and “Thundering”, which, even before the D-1 moved there, went to training ground No. 5. On that day, according to the observations of SNiS posts and ships, merchant ships did not enter Motovskaya Bay. Thus, range No. 6 was completely empty (unless, of course, we exclude that there was an unknown submarine in this square, which could ultimately lead to a collision).
A third version of the death of the D-1 was also put forward - the failure of the boat to a depth exceeding the maximum limit, due to which the durable hull of the boat could not withstand the water pressure. But the commander of the Northern Fleet decided that this version “can be excluded.” The reason for such a categorical conclusion was A.G. Golovko’s firm belief that D-1 had completed the entire course of 2nd line tasks and was preparing to move to the 1st line, and, moreover, “was one of the best in the Northern Fleet.” " The entire personnel of the boat, in the opinion of the commander, was “old”, the super-conscript petty officers were also “old”, the commander was experienced, [ * ], which allowed the crew, as a whole, to achieve a “high level of BP.” Such optimistic conclusions by A.G. Golovko were most likely based on the reports of the UAV commander, Captain 2nd Rank D.A. Pavlutsky, which were not properly verified by the Military Council. In addition, it was unprofitable for A.G. Golovko himself to admit both the low level of BP in the fleet and the existence of numerous cases of deception by formation commanders when “pushing” their ships into the category of advanced ones.
* – Note auto Giving such a high assessment of the operational training of the D-1 commander, A.G. Golovko may not have known about one incident a year ago. The fact is that on August 9, 1939, an unpleasant incident occurred: the commander of Shch-403 Art. Lieutenant F.M. Eltishchev ran his boat aground. For this incident, the former commander of the Northern Fleet, flagship 2nd rank V.P. Drozd, by his fleet order No. 00215 of August 21, 1939, reprimanded him. The commander of Shch-403 was accused of “exceptional personal indiscipline, gross violation of the charter, all rules and instructions for navigator service.”
Therefore, the Northern Fleet commander considered all three versions of the submarine disaster and suggested that “the cause of death was an explosion inside it,” but he could not formulate the cause of this explosion. It will be possible to finally clarify the circumstances of the death of the D-1, as Rear Admiral A.G. Golovko believed, only after its inspection or lifting from the ground.
It is characteristic that in his report No. 4543ss (about the death of D-1) dated November 14, 1940, sent to the First Secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks I.V. Stalin, Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR V.M. Molotov and Secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks ) A.A. Zhdanov, People's Commissar of the USSR Navy N.G. Kuznetsov basically agreed with the conclusions of A.G. Golovko, but still did not rush into assessments and did not rule out such a reason as incorrect actions of the submarine commander when diving to depth. In his opinion, possible reason The disaster could have been either going to a depth above the permissible one (while performing a diving exercise), “which could have occurred due to some malfunction in the control of the diving depth,” or some omission during an emergency diving exercise. And since the depths in the area where the boat disappeared ranged from 250 to 300 m, if forced to go to greater depths, the boat would simply be crushed by water pressure.
The first vague suspicions that something wrong was going on in the submarine brigade probably arose from the commander of the Northern Fleet on November 23, when in order No. 0466 he reprimanded the NSh UPL SF M.P. Avgustinovich. The formal reason was the late submission of the brigade's weekly BP plan. Not limiting himself to this, the commander demanded that the brigade commander pay special attention to the “disorder in the brigade headquarters.” A few days later, the fleet checked the condition of the ships' materiel. A particularly bleak picture emerged in the BPL.
On most boats, the condition of the mechanisms was considered unsatisfactory, and on Shch-404, M-175 and M-176 - poor. By order No. 0481 of November 26, 1940, the commander of the Northern Fleet announced that the commanders of the specified submarines would be reprimanded, and the commanders of the warhead-5 would be arrested for 7 days. But that was not all.
On November 27, 1940, Rear Admiral A.G. Golovko issued order No. 00475, which had an eloquent title: “Conclusions on the death of the submarine D-1 SF.” Based on the results of the latest inspection of the submarine and having raised the materials of the commissions on inspection of the submarine’s submarine for the entire year, the Fleet Armed Forces concluded that “this year D-1 passed the inspection with a gross violation of the sequence in performing tasks.” What followed was a whole list of specific violations committed through the fault of brigade commander D.A. Pavlutsky. In general, the brigade commander was charged with the fact that he systematically did not comply with the decisions of the Navy UBP commissions and did not radically restructure the “vicious practices of the BP.”
Acting with the sanction of the NKVMF, the commander of the Northern Fleet announced the removal of Captain 2nd Rank D.A. Pavlutsky from his post as commander of the BPL and his trial by the Military Tribunal. The remaining commanders, one way or another involved in the death of D-1, were also punished: the head of the 2nd department of the 2nd department (BP) of the fleet headquarters, captain 2nd rank Smirnov, was removed from his post and assigned to a less responsible job, NS BPL captain 3rd rank M.P.Avgustinovich was brought to the court of honor, and the commander of the 1st DPL, Captain 3rd Rank M.I. Gadzhiev was given a citation (“considering his impeccable service”). [ * ]
* – M.I. Gadzhiev was very lucky for the second time. The first time, back in the summer of 1940, he did not comply with the order of the head of the 2nd department of the Northern Fleet headquarters to arrive in Murmansk for a sports competition, for which he was subject to trial by the Military Tribunal, but, again thanks to his excellent service, he escaped with honor. And now he was lucky again, because D-1 was part of his division, and he personally took part in the acceptance of the boat from repair.
In conclusion, the fleet commander demanded to “unconditionally follow the sequence when passing the BP.” However, A.G. Golovko himself also suffered: the NK of the Navy severely reprimanded him “for the low level of safety in the fleet” (although the new commander served in this position for only four months).
The story of the D-1 “surfaced” at a meeting of the senior command staff of the Navy in Moscow, held in early December 1940. N.G. Kuznetsov, reflecting on the high accident rate in the fleet, recalled this incident and presented it as a clear example of how which results from poor command and violation of existing instructions. Several interesting points emerged here.
It turns out that on June 12, when the D-1 spontaneously filled up with pulp and paper, the boat commander F.M. Eltishchev recorded this incident in the “Combat Training Journal.” But the command of the brigade, as well as the fleet, ignored this case and did not draw any conclusions. Secondly, before putting the submarine into repair, F.M. Eltishchev specifically asked to pay special attention to the grinding in of the pulp and paper kingstones. After the repair, D-1 was received by another commander (D-3), so F.M. Eltishchev was not remembered about this request, and the acceptance was quite superficial. When F.M. Eltishchev took command again, he was not given time “so that he could independently check his boat after repairs.” In addition, on the D-1, as it turned out during the investigation, the horizontal rudders control cabinet “was not quite in order!”
The blame for the death of the boat, as N.G. Kuznetsov believed, lay entirely with the command of the BPL. The People's Commissar was sure that this incident could have been avoided “if the brigade commander had worked properly, if the commander at the headquarters who heads the 2nd submarine department had worked properly.” In conclusion, the NKVMF warned that such irresponsible cases, “as was allowed by Pavlutsky in the Northern Fleet,” should not be allowed in the future, and decisively demanded that the Military Councils of all fleets personally intervene in the submarine’s combat training system.
Meanwhile, the activities of the Navy commission to investigate the death of D-1 came to an end, and some conclusions were drawn. The People's Commissar of the Navy, relying on the materials of the commission, presented a report on the death of D-1 to the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks on December 19, 1939. Having reported already known facts about the submarine undergoing combat training in 1940 and the circumstances of its last campaign, N.G. Kuznetsov again considered possible versions of the disaster. As in his previous report, he believed that the most likely cause of the death of D-1 could be a sudden loss of buoyancy that occurred as a result of a leak in one of the tanks (“for example, the same pulp and paper plant”). The belated adoption of measures to keep the submarine from falling, which the People's Commissar explained by some confusion of the personnel (after all, the commander of the BC-5 was absent on this trip), could well have led to the fact that “the boat, having passed the maximum depth of the hull strength (100-120 m), “lost its tightness and hit the ground with great force, which was then accompanied by a large internal explosion.”
Naturally, this is just an assumption, but the most logical and reasonable. In any case, the other two versions - the explosion of a submarine on a drifting mine and an act of sabotage - were rejected by him as unlikely. The “mine version” did not convince him because a mine explosion at a shallow depth (5-10 m) would inevitably be accompanied by a large column of water (10-12 m) and a sound effect, and, therefore, would be clearly visible and audible from neighboring SNiS and NK posts. The encounter between a submarine and a mine at greater depths (10-20 m) was, in the opinion of the NKVMF, unrealistic, because at such depths the mine could not remain for long without losing its tightness. An act of sabotage by personnel associated with the detonation of an explosive brought in advance, as N.G. Kuznetsov believed, was “even less likely.”
Thus, a clear conclusion about the cause of the death of D-1 was never made: there were only assumptions.
In order to prevent such tragic incidents in the future, the NKVMF of the USSR categorically forbade violating the sequence of the BP (at the same time, he announced that a new KPL had been issued, which clearly indicated the sequence of the exercises), reminded the Military Councils of the fleets about the check (on their part) and reported that in A new “Regulation on ensuring the safety of submarine combat training” will soon be published. And indeed, this provision soon came out, where it was written in black and white: “Submarines should not dive at sea depths greater than the working depth of the boat.”
The Navy command was to a certain extent inclined towards one version - the failure of the submarine to a depth exceeding the maximum, as a result of which the boat was simply crushed by water pressure. Other reasons were also put forward, but they were all rejected as insufficient evidence. At the same time, such a version as an underwater collision with an unknown submarine (let's assume, German) was not considered.
Was such a case possible? Of course, it is possible, but there have been no applications for this kind of “victory”. Another version of the causes of the disaster was put forward. Thus, I.F. Tsvetkov confidently stated that the D-1 was blown up by mines that were allegedly placed by the Germans on the approaches to Zapadnaya Litsa Bay during the period when a secret German base was located there (1939-1940) (the so-called “Base Nord” "). However, it seems incredible that our naval command, leasing its territory for a naval base, knew nothing about the German minefields deployed in this area. It is doubtful that the Germans, leaving the base in Zapadnaya Litsa in the summer of 1940 (when relations between the USSR and Germany were still good), would not have cleared their mines. This would be contrary to the agreements concluded. But even if we assume that everything was exactly as I.F. Tsvetkov describes, then why didn’t the acoustics located nearby our EMs hear the underwater explosion?
In general, this version, although impressive, is not very suitable for explaining the reasons for the death of the boat.
The question of the D-1 disaster still remains open, and only an underwater study of the wreckage of the boat can clarify it.
List of sailors killed on D-1
1. Eltishchev Fedor Maksimovich, lieutenant captain, submarine commander
2. Prokhorenko Pyotr Mikhailovich, Art. politr., deputy com. on political matters
3. Grachev Ivan Ivanovich, Art. lieutenant, assistant commander
4. Vikhman Matvey Abramovich, Art. Lieutenant, commander of BC-1
5. Chernoknizhny Pyotr Lukich, lieutenant, commander of a torpedo group
6. Rodionov Alexey Georgievich, Jr. lieutenant, rudder commander groups
7. Belov Sergey Petrovich, military technician 2 wounds, commander of the movement group
8. Petrukhin Nikolay Semyonovich, paramedic
9. Arzubov Alexander Ivanovich, boatswain
10. Kisilev Ivan Vasilievich, commander of the helmsman squad
11. Chernov Pavel Ivanovich, helmsman
12. Agapov Mikhail Gavrilovich, helmsman
13. Borisov Alexander Pavlovich, helmsman
14. Golovach Ivan Timofeevich, student helmsman
15. Zatravkin Yuri Fedorovich, navigator electrician
16. Shagurin Evgeniy Konstantinovich, electrician apprentice
17. Titov Vasily Kuzmich, gunner
18. Ushakov Panteley Petrovich, foreman of the torpedo group
19. Kuzmin Ivan Sofronovich, commander of the torpedo squad
20. Barinov Fedor Ivanovich, torpedo operator
21. Aleshin Sergey Vasilievich, student torpedo operator
22. Gulyukin Ivan Andreevich, student torpedo operator
23. Kulakovsky Anatoly Andreevich, student torpedo operator
24. Beketov Alexey Semenovich, student torpedo operator
25. Sidorov Alexey Georgievich, radio operator
26. Khasanov Nazib Zarifovich, commander of the acoustics department
27. Proshagin Gennady Semenovich, acoustician student
28. Fedotov Vasily Sergeevich, foreman of a group of motorists
29. Kukov Alexander Alexandrovich, department commander. motorists
30. Zenin Viktor Vasilievich, motor mechanic
31. Romanov Vasily Romanovich, motor mechanic
32. Mitrofanov Mikhail Ivanovich, motor mechanic
33. Vinogradov Nikolay Yakovlevich, mechanic
34. Oboev Sergey Petrovich, motor mechanic
35. Abramenko Ivan Mikhailovich, apprentice mechanic
36. Bychkov Viktor Petrovich, apprentice mechanic
37. Borzov Vasily Denisovich, apprentice mechanic
38. Potapov David Aleksandrovich, foreman of the electricians group
39. Smirnov Anatoly Semenovich, electrician
40. Volkov Pyotr Efimovich, electrician
41. Chernyshev Vyacheslav Yakovlevich, electrician
42. Kromarvnko Alexander Semenovich, electrician
43. Vasiliev Egor Vasilievich, electrician apprentice
44. Malyshin Ivan Vasilievich, electrician
45. Akulov Alexander Gavrilovich, electrician apprentice
46. Gashpor Vasily Ivanovich, foreman of the bilge group
There are amazing secrets that everyone knows about, but there is no particular desire to solve them. The sea holds many secrets. People even have a saying - Amba! The key is to the bottom, and the ends are in the water! For 77 years now, such secrets have included the mysterious
In November 1940, under mysterious circumstances, the submarine “D-1” disappeared in Motovsky Bay (Barents Sea). Until now, the sailors of the crew are listed as missing. Surprising, but it's a fact!
FACT OF DISAPPEARANCE.
November 13, 1940 at 1:26 p.m. The commander of the submarine “D-1” (“Decembrist”) reported on the radio that he was ready to carry out the training mission. Which one is unclear. There are discrepancies in the documents - either diving training (task K-2 course), or torpedo firing (K - 3). This was the last radiogram from the Dekabrist. After the radio transmission, the boat sank under the periscope.
Let's not get carried away with nautical terms, let's say briefly - the submarine with its entire crew disappeared into the visual visibility zone from the naval coastal observation posts, presumably in room 15. (about 3 km) from Bolshoi Arsky Island in Motovsky Bay at a depth of 70-130 meters.
Since the above-mentioned radiogram there has been no further news from D-1. In the evening, when the deadline for the report from the submarine expired, the search for it began. They continued until November 26, but to no avail.
Writer, captain 1st rank V.N. Boyko, in his book “Forgotten Submarines of the Navy,” gives a detailed history of the D-1, cites current versions of its death, but does not draw exact conclusions.
Another writer and journalist, also captain 1st rank, S.A., carefully studied the death of “D-1”. Kovalev, who recently died suddenly. And the mystery of the death or disappearance of “D-1” has been waiting for a solution for 77 years.
VERSIONS OF DEATH.
Still, the main official version of the death, and not the disappearance, is considered to be the dive of the “D-1” to an prohibitive depth due to the fault of the personnel or due to a malfunction of the horizontal rudders, which raises many doubts among professional submariners.
This could really happen (but only in the central part of Motovsky Bay, where the depth is more than 200 m. - V.K.). This version is too obvious and superficial, and therefore more accessible. But why has everyone been silent about the death of a submarine in our country for 77 years? Why do the true reasons for the death of the “Decembrist” remain a mystery to this day and are of no interest to any of the officials?
No, individual researchers like S.A. Kovalev raised this issue, wrote articles and books. Sergei Kovalev even has seven versions that have the right to exist. There were even attempts to find the D-1 submarine, but for some reason they were interrupted as soon as it came to the point. And here only one answer suggests itself: that this secret is involved in politics.
Events on the Kola Peninsula from the spring of 1940 to the spring of 1941 received little public coverage, so until recently there was only fragmentary information about them. But even what has become known is to a certain extent connected with the existence on our territory of the Nazi base “Basis Nord” (Zapadnaya Litsa region), and this is the bay of Motovsky Bay.
Now it is no secret that the British, who were already waging war against Hitler, also knew about this fascist base. Beginning in February 1940, radio intelligence of the Northern Fleet (SF) daily reported to the command about the detection of radio conversations of Norwegian and English ships in the immediate vicinity of our territorial waters in the Barents Sea. They became more active in March 1940, when the British learned that the Germans would try to use the Nord base to capture Norway.
Information about the base was kept in the strictest confidence and was known to I. Stalin and his immediate circle. The Northern Fleet command was little informed about it. These were games of the highest echelon of authorities. Therefore, one of the versions, political, put forward by S. Kovalev, has logic.
POLITICAL COMPONENT.
In his book “The Shadow of the Third Reich over Taimyr” S. Kovalev, in the chapters devoted to the death of “D-1”, based on political motives, admits that it was a “cruel” staging, but with a caveat - “However, I’ll immediately make a reservation that to date its possible goal has not been established, and indirect evidence is still extremely weak. And only the presence or, conversely, the absolute absence of the “Decembrist” in Motovsky Bay can become at least some practical confirmation of this hypothesis.”
On my own behalf I can add that not only this version, but also all the others. After all, the question of the Decembrist tragedy remains open to this day, and only an underwater study of the wreckage or the entire D-1 can clarify it. Today there are enough funds for this, but there is not enough will. After all, we are sending our deep-sea vehicle “Falcon” into the Java Sea with a diving depth of up to 1000 meters to look for the black boxes of someone else’s aircraft, but no one is interested in our own boat, and 55 crew members still, for 77 years, remain missing. Also a secret?
SECRET OPERATIONS.
Recently, materials about some secret operations of the Northern Fleet in 1940 have begun to appear in the press. They speak of the paucity of information about that time. I believe that we are again talking about the secret German base “Nord”, located in Zapadnaya Litsa. And the secret escort of the fascist raider “Kommet” along the Northern Sea Route, together with the Soviet submarine “Shch-423”, as part of the EON (special purpose expedition). And I assume that the death of “D-1” is directly related to these events. The only question that remains open is who was the victim of “D-1”, the Germans or the British?
The British conducted reconnaissance of the Motovsky Bay with their submarines, knowing about the secret German base. This area had been familiar to them since the First World War. German submariners mastered the waters of the Barents Sea and guarded their base in Motovsky Bay. And Soviet submariners, without suspecting this, conducted combat training at training ground No. 6 in Motovsky Bay. The Decembrist, which fell into dismantling, may have become a victim of the duel between the Germans and the British. After all, on November 13, 1940, observation posts did not see surface targets in this area, did not hear strong underwater explosions...
And again, the primary elements in solving the mystery of the death of “D-1” remain the discovery and inspection of the ship on the ground, and, if possible, its raising in order to establish it as a monument to the pioneer of the Northern Fleet.
R.S. The disappearance of the submarine “D-1” (“Decembrist”) remains a mystery to this day. But riddles exist to be solved. And if there is no desire to solve them, they will forever remain mysteries. Such is the tragedy of the Kursk nuclear submarine, which remains a mystery for centuries.
Vadim KULINCHENKO , captain 1st rank, veteran submariner
Moscow region
